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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC USE OF EVIDENCE USING A
PSYCHOLOGICALLY REALISTIC PARADIGM: IMPROVING DIAGNOSTICITY
OF ELICITED INFORMATION IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM
by
Amelia Susan Mindthoff
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Jacqueline Evans, Major Professor
The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) is an interrogation method that uses
strategic timing (e.g., early vs. late disclosure) and framing of evidence disclosure to
elicit verbal cues that can help interrogators discriminate between liars and truth-tellers.
Despite mounting empirical support for its efficacy, there are gaps in the SUE literature
that the present research addresses (e.g., studying SUE using a psychologically realistic
interrogation paradigm). In Study 1, community members engaged in a supposed
government-funded knowledge test. During testing, a research assistant posing as another
participant prompted (guilty condition) or did not prompt (innocent condition)
participants to cheat. An interrogator then accused both guilty and innocent participants
of cheating and questioned them using either: early disclosure (evidence presented before
questioning; antithesis of SUE), late disclosure (evidence presented after questioning;
original SUE), SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C; evidence presented incrementally, with
statements inconsistent with the evidence being pointed out), or SUEConfrontation/Explain (SUE-C/E; same as SUE-C, but suspects are asked to explain
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statement-evidence inconsistencies). The interrogation ended with a confession elicitation
phase. The results revealed that guilty (vs. innocent) participants were more likely to
confess, but evidence disclosure method did not influence confessions. When SUE-C or
SUE-C/E was used, guilty (vs. innocent) participants’ statements were more inconsistent
with the evidence. To assess whether SUE-C and SUE-C/E are also effective in
enhancing deception detection accuracy, Study 2 participants viewed Study 1
interrogation videos (one guilty, one innocent) in which either early disclosure, late
disclosure, SUE-C, or SUE-C/E was used. After making initial veracity judgments,
participants read that interviewees had confessed, and then rendered a second veracity
judgment. Findings indicated that SUE-C/E and late disclosure resulted in deception
detection accuracy that significantly exceeded chance responding. Furthermore, postconfession accuracy rates exceeded chance responding in only the SUE-C/E condition.
Taken together, these studies’ results lend support for the implementation of SUE, and
especially SUE-C/E, methods during interrogations. Future studies should focus on
continuing to refine SUE and developing effective training programs for law
enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suspect interrogations constitute an integral part of criminal investigations. The
interrogation represents a pivotal point in the course of an investigation, as it is a time
during which police investigators may determine whether or not to pursue further
investigation of a suspect. However, some interrogation methods used by law
enforcement have the potential to result in non-diagnostic information that can ultimately
lead investigators to make incorrect classifications of suspects’ culpability. Such errors
are highly problematic, as they can result in the release of guilty perpetrators or the
detention of innocent people. Research on interrogation methods has traditionally focused
on assessing the pitfalls of such non-diagnostic methods, primarily in an effort to reduce
the occurrence of false confessions and subsequent wrongful convictions. However, there
has been a recent shift in the research narrative: There are increasing efforts to develop
methods that can improve the diagnosticity of information elicited during an
interrogation. This shift in research emphasis has stemmed from a push towards
promoting methods grounded in “scientific knowledge” (i.e., methods stemming from
empirical research) in place of methods derived from “customary knowledge” (i.e.,
methods stemming from experience and passed on via observation and word of mouth;
Swanner, Meissner, Atkinson, & Dianiska, 2016). The current research sought to
contribute to this push towards evidence-based methods by examining the effectiveness
of a theoretically-grounded evidence disclosure technique at eliciting diagnostic
information and confessions. Specifically, the current studies will examine the
effectiveness of several variations of the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique.
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The SUE technique was designed to improve investigators’ judgments about the
veracity of suspects’ statements during questioning via strategically disclosing evidence
to the suspect (e.g., presenting evidence after obtaining suspects’ statements, as opposed
to the more traditional practice of presenting evidence early in the interrogation). In past
research, SUE has resulted in: (1) liars’ statements being more inconsistent with the
evidence than truth-tellers’ statements, and (2) improved deception detection accuracy
(e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, &
Kronkvist, 2006). Recently, two ecologically-valid SUE variations have been introduced:
SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) and SUE-Confrontation/Explain (SUE-C/E; Tekin et al.,
2015; Tekin, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2016). In addition to inducing liars to be more
inconsistent with the evidence, SUE-C and SUE-C/E also have the potential to result in
guilty suspects being increasingly forthcoming and likely to offer admissions of guilt.
Although these developments are encouraging, there are gaps in the research that
need to be addressed before promoting SUE-C and/or SUE-C/E to law enforcement. The
aim of the current studies was to address these gaps, thereby contributing to research on
science-based criminal justice practice that is relevant to enhancing investigations.
Specifically, Study 1 used an experimental paradigm high in psychological realism that
enabled examination of SUE’s effectiveness when questioning suspects who have (or
have not) engaged in an intentional transgression. Using a psychologically realistic
paradigm is new to the SUE literature, as only mock crime role playing scenarios have
been used in past research (i.e., participants were explicitly told to commit a “crime” they
knew would not result in serious repercussions). Study 1 therefore offers improved
insight into how real-world suspects may react to SUE questioning. Additionally, Study 2
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examined which SUE variation best aids observers in distinguishing between guilty and
innocent suspects. In sum, the current research aimed to offer new empirical evidence for
the effectiveness and suitability of SUE as a method that law enforcement officers can
employ in order to achieve their goals of gathering information useful to investigations
and obtaining true (vs. false) confessions from suspects.
Use of Evidence in Suspect Interrogations
Evidence disclosure plays a large role in suspect interviewing. Indeed,
observational studies of real-life police interrogations reveal that the presentation of
incriminating evidence against suspects (whether real or fabricated) is one of the most
commonly used interrogation tactics (e.g., Kassin et al., 2007; Kelly, Redlich, & Miller,
2016; Leo, 1996). Considering interrogators’ frequent use of evidence disclosure in the
field, it is important to understand how different types of evidence presentation affect
both interrogator decisions (e.g., regarding whether the suspect is guilty or innocent) and
suspect decisions (e.g., whether to make incriminating statements or not).
The Role of Evidence in Interrogations
Types of Evidence Use
In the context of interrogations, presentation of evidence is comprised of a cluster
of tactics that interrogators employ to indicate to a suspect1 what the authorities know, or
claim to know, in an effort to elicit more information (Kelly, Miller, Redlich, &
Kleinman, 2013). In line with the definition of presentation of evidence, Kelly et al.

1

Depending on the type of interrogations being examined (e.g., forensic interrogations or humanintelligence gathering interrogations), the interviewee is referenced to as ‘source’ or ‘suspect.’ For the
present study, only the term ‘suspect’ will be used for the sake of simplicity, and because this study focuses
on forensic interrogations.
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(2013) identified eight common forms of evidence presentation in the interrogationrelated literature. These tactics include: confronting the suspect with actual incriminating
evidence; confronting the suspect with fabricated incriminating evidence; evidence bluffs
(i.e., indicating that potentially incriminating evidence exists, such as untested DNA);
highlighting contradictions in the suspect’s statements; revealing evidence to the suspect
to show the suspect that he or she is not able to disclose any more useful information
until he or she eventually does so; presenting results from polygraphs or other
physiological measures; sharing photos or witness statements specifically; and using
visual aids. Any one of these tactics can be (and often are) employed in conjunction with
one or more other evidence presentation tactics.
Overall, interrogators will use evidence ploys to convince suspects that there is
incriminating and conclusive evidence against them (Ofshe & Leo, 1997). Evidence
ploys are developed with the goal of leading suspects to believe that the case against
them is highly compelling and that their only choice is to confess (Leo, 2008). To achieve
their goal, interrogators will confront suspects with actual, existing incriminating
evidence (i.e., true evidence ploys) or with fabricated evidence (i.e., false evidence
ploys). As postulated by Ofshe and Leo (1997), the use of such evidence ploys likely
results in guilty suspects “giving up” and in innocent suspects recognizing that there is
little hope for their situation.
Prevalence of Evidence Use
Both self-report and observational studies demonstrate evidence use to be
extremely common during suspect interrogations. For instance, a survey of U.S. law
enforcement investigators revealed that interrogators often “confront the suspect with
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evidence of his guilt” and sometimes “imply or pretend to have independent evidence of
guilt” (Kassin et al., 2007). Interrogators also reported that on rare occasions they present
suspects with crime scene or victim photographs, or conduct polygraph exams and tell the
suspects that they failed the test. Kelly et al.’s (2015) international self-report survey
revealed similar results, as presentation of evidence was cited as the third most-used
interrogation method, following rapport and relationship building and
confrontation/competition. Interrogators’ self-reported use of presentation of evidence
was empirically supported by Kelly et al.’s (2015) subsequent content analysis of 31
recorded interrogations retrieved from the Los Angeles Police Department’s RobberyHomicide Division, which revealed that presentation of evidence was used second-most
frequently during questioning, following only rapport and relationship building.
Such self-report findings are further bolstered by field studies. In his seminal
observational study of live and videotaped U.S. custodial interrogations, Leo (1996)
noted that confronting suspects with actual incriminating evidence was one of the two
most frequently used interrogation tactics across the 153 interrogations he observed, as it
was used in 85% of the cases. Another field study similarly found that the tactic U.S.
interrogators’ most commonly employed was confronting suspects with evidence or with
the allegation that there was a witness (Wald, Ayres, Hess, Schantz, & Whitebread II,
1967). Furthermore, Leo (1996) found that confronting suspects with fabricated
incriminating evidence was also often used (observed in 30% of the cases). Leo also
noted that true and false evidence ploys typically occurred at the onset of the
interrogation. Overall, about 90% of Leo’s observed interrogations involved the detective
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confronting the suspect with real or fabricated evidence and then suggesting that it would
be in the suspect’s best interest to confess.
Theory Linking Evidence and Confession Behaviors
Evidence plays a large role in suspects’ interrogation decision making. Indeed, in
their meta-analysis assessing which psychological factors underlie guilty and innocent
suspects’ decision to confess in experimental contexts, Houston, Meissner, and Evans
(2014) found that suspects’ perceptions of the strength of evidence and the proof of their
guilt emerged as a significant predictor of true confessions, but not false confessions.
Furthermore, in his assessment of twelve studies on English police interrogations, Vrij
(2003) found that strength of evidence was a commonly reported significant predictor of
confession.
Such findings support theoretical constructs that have been developed to explain
why suspects confess. Moston, Stephenson, and Williamson (1992) proposed that three
factors contribute to suspects’ decision to confess: (1) the suspect’s and the crime’s
background characteristics; (2) the case’s contextual characteristics; and (3) the
interrogator’s questioning techniques. In brief, this model posits that interrogators’
questioning methods are influenced by their attitudes and beliefs, both of which are
influenced by the case’s background and contextual characteristics, and that the suspect’s
initial response during an interrogation is determined by the three aforementioned factors.
Additionally, the suspect might change subsequent responses as a result of changes in the
interrogator’s line of questioning that are made based on the interrogator’s interpretation
of the suspect’s strategy.
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Most relevant to the present research are Moston et al.’s (1992) contextual
characteristics, one of which is evidence. According to Moston et al., the strength of the
existing evidence in a case is presumably a prominent predictor of suspect behavior and
interrogator questioning method. As related to interrogators, when the interrogator has
access to stronger rather than weaker evidence, he has a greater number of evidencerelated strategies at his disposal. For suspects, gaining a sense of what pieces of evidence
the police have is highly crucial in their decision to engage in denial or confession
behaviors. For example, if it is unclear to a suspect that the police have strong
incriminating evidence against him, then the suspect may initially deny involvement in
the crime. Denial strategies can, however, backfire and ultimately lead the suspect to
confess if the interrogator later reveals that he possesses strong evidence against the
suspect. Indeed, after analyzing 1,067 cases, Moston et al. (1992) found that the number
of admissions of guilt was high when the evidence was strong (66.7% of 430 cases),
whereas the number of denials was high when the evidence was weak (76.6% of 274
cases).
Gudjonsson’s (2003) cognitive-behavioral model of confessions also attests to the
role that evidence plays in suspects’ confession decisions. The model posits that the
likelihood of a suspect confessing is determined by a number of factors (social,
emotional, cognitive, situational, and physiological) and their relationship to short- and
long-term consequences of confessing. Of interest to the present research are cognitive
events (i.e., “the suspect’s thoughts, interpretations, assumptions, and perceived strategies
of responding to a given situation,” p.127), as these events can have implications for
suspect decisions in light of evidence. Importantly, these cognitive events do not involve

7

the interrogator’s actual behaviors, but rather the suspect’s subjective perception of the
situation. For example, a suspect might be more likely to confess to the extent that he
perceives the interrogator to hold strong evidence against him. Considering the
implications of cognitive events, interrogators presumably have the possibility of
employing tactics that play off of suspects’ perceptions of the evidence known to
interrogators.
Summary
Interrogators in the field often make use of evidence presentation techniques
during suspect interrogations. Thus, it is crucial that the effects of evidence presentation
methods on interrogation outcomes, specifically confession behaviors, are examined,
especially since evidence strength is an important predictor of confession decisions and
because evidence plays a role in confession decision making models. As such, the next
section will review existing literature that explores the relationship between evidencerelated interrogation techniques and confession behaviors.
Empirical Studies Examining Evidence Presentation Tactics and Confessions
Interrogation research has primarily focused on demonstrating that coercive
interrogation methods (i.e., methods that minimize suspects’ perceptions of the degree to
which they have the choice to confess or not) increase the rate of false confessions (see
Kassin et al., 2010, for the White Paper on false confessions). A number of these coercive
methods involve the use of evidence. Empirical studies, as highlighted below, have
demonstrated that some ways in which evidence is used have the potential to result in
false confessions.
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Empirically Examining False Confessions
Kassin and Kiechel (1996) examined the effect that false incrimination evidence
has on false confession rates. In their study, an experimenter told participants that they
were to type letters spoken either slowly or quickly by a confederate.2 The experimenter
warned participants to not touch the ALT key because doing so would result in the
computer crashing and loss of data. Regardless of whether the ALT key was in fact
pressed, the computer malfunctioned during the typing task. An experimenter then
accused participants of having pressed the forbidden ALT key (i.e., of having committed
a “crime”). All participants denied having pressed the forbidden key. The researchers
then manipulated the use of false incriminating evidence. Specifically, the experimenter
asked the confederate if she saw anything, to which the confederate either “admitted” to
seeing the participants press the ALT key (false incriminating evidence) or stated that she
did not see what had happened (no evidence). Results revealed that false confession rates
were higher when participants were presented with false incriminating evidence
compared to no evidence. The effect of the evidence ploy was further exaggerated for
participants in the fast-typing condition, as 100% of these 17 participants falsely
confessed to pressing the ALT key.
Even indicating that potentially incriminating evidence exists (i.e., evidence
bluffs) can enhance false confession rates. Using Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) ALT key
paradigm, Perillo and Kassin (2011) manipulated whether participants were presented
with: false witness evidence (confederate saw participants hit the ALT key); an evidence

2

A confederate is a research assistant who is pretending to be a participant. Actual participants are not
aware that confederates are part of the research team.
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bluff (keystrokes were recorded and could be checked, but had not been checked yet); a
combination of the false witness evidence and the evidence bluff; witness affirmation of
innocence (confederate stated that participants’ hands were not near the ALT key); or no
tactic (confederate stated that she did not see anything and the keystroke recording was
not mentioned). The researchers found that, similar to presenting false evidence, evidence
bluffs increased the rate of false confessions as compared to when no tactics were used.
Specifically, 87% of participants in the bluff condition, 79% in the false evidence
condition, and 77% in the combination condition falsely confessed, whereas a mere 27%
of participants in the no tactics condition falsely confessed (note: the false confession rate
in the innocence-affirmation condition was 36%, indicating the high-pressure nature of
the paradigm).
While these findings emphasize the need to steer away from deceptive
interrogation methods related to evidence presentation such as false evidence ploys and
bluffs, they offer no insight on how to use actual incriminating evidence in a productive
manner. This lack of insight is due to the fact that these findings stem from a paradigm
that restricts researchers to assessing only false confession rates, and can be addressed by
employing a paradigm that facilitates examination of confession diagnosticity (i.e., ratio
of true to false confessions). By doing so, researchers can gain better insight regarding
which evidence presentation approaches are most effective in increasing true confessions
while simultaneously reducing the risk of false confessions.
Empirically Examining Confession Diagnosticity
While Kassin and Kiechel’s (1996) ALT key paradigm enables researchers to
examine false confession rates, it does not allow researchers to examine true confession
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rates. Participants are generally unaware of whether or not they even committed the
“crime” that they are being accused of. Furthermore, researchers employing this
paradigm presume all participants to be innocent (i.e., the computer is programmed to
always malfunction). Thus, the ALT key paradigm does not enable researchers to
determine whether interrogation tactics are diagnostic (i.e., increase the likelihood that a
true confession is elicited while simultaneously decreasing the likelihood that a false
confession is elicited).
To address this pitfall of the ALT key paradigm, Russano, Meissner, Narchet, and
Kassin (2005) introduced the “cheating paradigm.” With this paradigm, an experimenter
has the participant work with a confederate as a pair on a group task, during which the
participant collaborates with the confederate to respond to the task questions. Upon
completion of the group task, the experimenter has the participant and the confederate
work on an individual task, explicitly telling them that they are to work alone and are not
allowed to share answers. It is during this individual task that the culpability
manipulation is introduced. In the guilty condition, the confederate asks the participant
for the answer to one of the task questions. By responding to the confederate’s request,
the participant is effectively violating one of the experimental rules and is therefore
guilty. This transgression does not happen in the innocent condition, as the confederate
does not prompt the participant to cheat.
After the tasks, both guilty and innocent participants are accused of cheating,
interrogated, and told that they may be charged with academic dishonesty. Overall, the
cheating paradigm enables researchers to determine the diagnostic value of applied
interrogation tactics in a psychologically realistic setting: Participants intentionally
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commit a transgression on their own volition (or not) and are led to believe that there are
potential consequences for their accused actions. The cheating paradigm further offers
researchers with an ethical solution to studying suspect interrogations in a more
externally valid manner than the ALT key paradigm.
Since its introduction, researchers have tailored the cheating paradigm to address
important questions in the interrogation field. Most relevant to the present research is the
variation introduced by Evans et al. (2013), in which a participant and a confederate
complete what they believe to be a national assessment of college students’ knowledge.
They are monetarily incentivized to correctly answer the test questions. Before beginning
the assessment, the participant and the confederate are told that they should complete the
assessment as a pair, but that they should not use any additional resources to answer the
questions.
In the guilty condition, the confederate uses a cheat sheet to answer some of the
questions before pulling out a “forbidden” cellphone to call a friend and ask for answers
to the remaining questions. The confederate then copies down the test questions to give to
a friend that will be participating in the experiment in the future. In the innocent
condition, the confederate does not use a cheat sheet or copy down test questions;
however, the confederate uses a “forbidden” cellphone to call a friend and complain
about the test’s difficulty (but not to cheat). In the next phase of the paradigm, an
experimenter informs the participant, regardless of culpability condition, that an
unusually high number of the test questions were answered correctly, leading the
experimenter to believe that cheating might have occurred. The interrogation of the
participant then commences.
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The primary benefit of the Evans et al. (2013) paradigm lies with the procedure’s
complexity. Specifically, the multiple actions performed by the confederate renders fewer
restrictions on the amount of information that can be elicited from participants, as
compared to Russano et al.’s (2005) original cheating paradigm. In the original cheating
paradigm, the entire cheating incident involves a two-sentence exchange between the
confederate and the participant. The complexity of the Evans et al. (2013) variation
allows researchers to better examine the effectiveness of different interrogation methods
in maximizing the amount of information elicited from an interviewee—a benefit that is
highly advantageous to the further development of new evidence-based interrogation
tactics. Furthermore, the increased number of actions performed by the confederate
contributes to a higher number of possible pieces of evidence. The increase in the amount
of evidence renders the Evans et al. variation of the cheating paradigm useful when
empirically assessing evidence presentation tactics, and thus useful to the present
research.
Informing the Development of Interrogation Methods with Science
The confession literature’s existing strong focus on false confession research is
not unwarranted, as actual wrongful conviction cases indicate that false confessions can,
and do, occur (see Drizin & Leo, 2004). However, legal psychology researchers have
begun to develop theory-derived interrogation methods that are effective at eliciting
valuable information from withholding suspects—information that can help investigators
better solve cases. As Vrij et al. (2017) discuss, mounting empirical evidence underlines
the ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation tactics because of their tendency to elicit
false confessions, and thus emphasize the need to employ evidence-based approaches that
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improve assessments of suspects’ credibility (i.e., are suspects offering true or false
information). One such evidence-based technique is the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE),
a technique that is meant to (and indeed does) enhance the accuracy of investigators’
credibility judgments (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2006; Luke et al., 2016).
The Strategic Use of Evidence: Perspectives from the Deception Detection
Literature
At its core, the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique is a questioning
framework that relies on the strategic handling of available evidence in an effort to elicit
useful cues to deception (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). Specifically, SUE involves
interrogators initially withholding incriminating evidence from suspects and only
divulging the evidence at strategic moments throughout the interview, all the while
posing free recall questions (e.g., “Can you tell me everything that happened on that
day?”) and evidence-specific questions that purposefully do not disclose the
incriminating evidence (e.g., asking “Were you in the park?” when shoeprint evidence
already suggests that the suspect was indeed in the park). Multiple variations of the SUE
technique have been examined, and all studies point towards SUE’s effectiveness in
enabling observers to better distinguish between liars and truth-tellers on the basis of
verbal deceptive cues (i.e., statement-evidence inconsistencies), as compared to more
traditional evidence presentation methods (i.e., early evidence disclosure).
Theoretical Development of SUE
Triggered by professional interrogators’ common practice of presenting all of the
incriminating evidence they have at the onset of the interrogation (i.e., “early disclosure;”
e.g., Leo, 1996), Pär Anders Granhag, Maria Hartwig, and their colleagues have pursued
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a systematic line of research examining the effects of timing and mode of evidence
presentation in suspect interviews. Presenting evidence early on during an interrogation
can have detrimental effects for an interrogation’s outcome. Read, Powell, Kebbell, and
Milne (2009) posit that early evidence disclosure can result in higher levels of suspect
aggression or denial, especially if a suspect believes that the interrogator has already
made up his mind about what happened. Early evidence disclosure also enables suspects
to mold a story that explains the incriminating evidence in an innocuous manner, as they
are aware of the evidence against them before they provide their statements.
Such reactions by suspects to early evidence disclosure can be classified as
counter-interrogation strategies, which are broadly defined as suspects’ methods of
successfully navigating an interrogation while maintaining their credibility (Granhag,
Hartwig, Mac Giolla, & Clemens, 2015). As argued by Granhag et al. (2015), “the best
approach to an interrogation is to understand the counter-interrogation techniques as
practiced by suspects” (p. 293). By predicting which strategies suspects will implement
during an interrogation, investigators can better plan how to successfully conduct their
interrogations.
To gain a sense of the types of counter-interrogation strategies suspects might
implement, it is useful to consider the matter from a self-presentational perspective.
DePaulo (1992) defined self-presentation as managing one’s own behavior in an effort to
generate a particular impression of oneself on others. Applying this perspective to the
interrogative setting, it is likely that guilty and innocent suspects both aim to create the
same impression, namely that of someone honest and innocent. To achieve such a goal,
suspects must engage in self-control in order to appear credible, and thus their strategies
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can be understood from a self-regulation theoretical perspective (Granhag & Hartwig,
2008; Granhag & Luke, 2018).
Self-regulation theory posits that as people pursue their desired goals, they evade
undesired outcomes by managing their behavior (Carver & Scheier, 2012). Granhag and
Hartwig (2008) clearly delineated how self-regulation theory applies to the criminal
questioning context. Specifically, all suspects perceive the impending interrogation as a
threat because: (1) they lack knowledge regarding what, and how much, information the
interrogator holds, and (2) there is a chance that they might be deemed guilty by the
interrogator. Suspects’ perception of threat subsequently initiates self-regulatory
processes. In attempting to restore control over the situation, suspects can engage in
either behavioral methods (e.g., remain silent during the interrogation) or cognitive
methods (e.g., deciding how to construct their statement). Of specific relevance to
studying evidence disclosure tactics are suspects’ cognitive methods, namely,
information control (i.e., gaining a sense of control via gathering information about an
aversive event; Johnson, 1984) and decision control (i.e., gaining a sense of control via
making a decision on how to handle the aversive event; Averill, 1973). Below, these
cognitive methods are described in relation to the psychology of guilty and innocent
suspects.
Psychology of the Guilty and the Innocent
As discussed, both guilty and innocent suspects presumably view an interrogation
as a threat (although presumably to a lesser extent for innocent suspects). However,
Granhag and Hartwig (2008) posit that because guilty and innocent suspects’ knowledge
of crime-relevant information differs, the problems that they face during interrogation
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and the tactics that they use to address these problems also differ. Specifically, a guilty
suspect is typically cognizant of all crime-relevant information since he is the perpetrator
of the crime. As such, during interrogation, he is faced with the problem of not letting the
interrogator discover this incriminating information, and thus seeks to conceal
information. Conversely, an innocent suspect wants the interrogator to learn everything
that he (the innocent suspect) knows, as this should ultimately support his innocence
(note: there are instances in which innocent suspects too aim to conceal information, but
this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the present research; Granhag & Luke, 2018).
Even though the types of problems guilty and innocent suspects face differ, they
will both presumably engage in information control as they attempt to predict what will
occur during the forthcoming interrogation. Extent of information control might be
especially high for guilty suspects, who will likely try to determine what incriminating
evidence the interrogator already possesses. The results of these information control
activities will ultimately influence the counter-interrogation strategies suspects employ
during their interrogation (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008).
Although they are similar in regard to information control, guilty and innocent
suspects’ actions do diverge in relation to how they decide to act during the interview
(i.e., decision control). Specifically, guilty and innocent suspects have to decide what
information they will present and conceal while making their statements (i.e., which
information management strategies to employ; Granhag & Luke, 2018). Given that guilty
suspects seek to conceal incriminating information, they will presumably engage in either
avoidance (e.g., omitting details from their statements) or denial (e.g., opposing evidence
presented to them) strategies. It is assumed that guilty suspects engage in such strategies
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because they view the interrogator becoming knowledgeable of the concealed
information as an aversive stimulus, which therefore leads them to seek avoidance of
(preventing an encounter with) or escape from (eliminating) the aversive stimuli
(Carlson, Buskist, & Martin, 2000).
In contrast, innocent suspects will presumably be more forthcoming. Innocents’
forthcomingness can be explained by two phenomena (as delineated by Granhag &
Hartwig, 2008, and Granhag & Luke, 2018). First, innocent suspects might foster a belief
in a just world (Lerner, 1980). In response to undeserved outcomes threatening the
maintenance of a belief in a just world, people will alter their perceptions of an individual
so that the individual’s fate shifts from being unjust to just. Put simply, people ultimately
believe that others get what they deserve (Hafer & Sutton, 2016). Thus, an innocent
suspect might believe that his statement will be deemed truthful and therefore makes little
attempt to hide incriminating information, because being judged as a liar counters his
belief that the world is just. Second, innocent suspects’ forthcomingness can be explained
by the illusion of transparency phenomenon, which refers to the tendency for people to
believe that their internal thoughts and feelings are “seen” by others (Gilovich, Savitsky,
& Medvec, 1998). Innocent suspects might therefore overly rely on their incorrect
perception that the interrogator will see their innocence. In sum, innocent suspects
believe that they have nothing to hide and that the interrogator will come to recognize
their “transparent” innocence, all due to their perception that “the power of their own
innocence [will] set them free” (Kassin, 2005, p. 218). Thus, innocent suspects will not
likely try to cover up incriminating aspects of their stories.
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Theoretically-Derived Predictions and Empirical Support for Suspects’
Strategies. The psychology of guilty and innocent suspects lends support to five
predictions about suspects’ behaviors as set forth by Granhag and Hartwig (2008). The
predictions are as follows:
(1) Guilty suspects will plan/strategize before an interrogation.
(2) Guilty suspects will attempt to avoid disclosing incriminating information.
(3) When unable to avoid disclosure, guilty suspects will engage in denial (i.e.,
deny knowing, or contradict, incriminating evidence when posed a direct
question by the interrogator).
(4) Innocent suspects will be less likely to have a plan before being interrogated,
as compared to guilty suspects.
(5) Innocent suspects will be forthcoming and only tell the truth.
Mounting empirical evidence lends support to these aforementioned predictions
about suspects’ strategies. For instance, to examine nonverbal and verbal differences
between liars and truth tellers, Strömwall, Hartwig, and Granhag (2007) directed 30
participants to engage in either a mock crime (bought or sold fake drugs) or in an
innocent act (buy a food item). Next, all participants were interrogated by in-training
police officers who were told that the people they would be questioning were suspected
of buying or selling drugs. Prior to the interrogation, those who engaged in the mock
crime were told to lie and convince the interrogator that they bought a food item, and
those who engaged in the innocent act were told to tell the interrogator the truth about
their actions. Results revealed that a high percentage of liars’ go-to verbal strategy was to
‘keep it simple’ (46.7%), whereas the majority of truth tellers’ primary verbal strategy
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was to ‘keep it real’ (50.0%). Furthermore, a smaller percentage of liars (11.1%)
indicated that they had ‘no [verbal] strategy,’ as compared to truth tellers (30.8%; note:
the authors did not indicate whether this was a statistically-significant difference).
Similarly, Hartwig, Granhag, and Strömwall (2007) had participants either
commit a mock crime (liars) or not (truth tellers) and then had police trainees question
participants. The researchers found that a significantly larger proportion of liars (60.5%)
developed a strategy pre-interrogation, as compared to truth tellers (37.5%). Furthermore,
liars exhibited a range of strategies pertaining to their verbal statements (i.e., told a
detailed story, avoided lying, remained consistent with their story, offered an alibi, and/or
presented an unrehearsed story). Truth-tellers, on the other hand, were cooperative and
primarily sought to ‘tell the truth like it happened.’
Taken together, these empirical findings lend support to Granhag and Hartwig’s
(2008) five predictions regarding suspects’ interrogation strategies. The aforementioned
findings regarding counter-interrogation strategies can thus be used to inform the
development of best-practice interrogation methods. It is useful to know that innocent
suspects are likely to be forthcoming; however, a goal of investigative interviewing is to
have all suspects be forthcoming. Thus, shifting guilty suspects from denial and/or
avoidance to forthcomingness is crucial for eliciting new critical information that can
contribute to the progress of an investigation. One way to achieve this shift is to use the
SUE technique to play on suspects’ perceptions of the evidence held by the interrogator.
The SUE Model
Originally proposed by Granhag (2010, as cited by Granhag & Hartwig, 2015) at
a conference held by the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, the SUE model is a
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higher order conceptualization of the practical SUE technique, and offers researchers and
practitioners a conceptual framework to enhance understanding of the mechanisms by
which SUE works and how to apply SUE to specific cases. Granhag and Hartwig (2015)
extensively discuss the SUE model, which consists of two levels: strategic and tactical
(see Figure 1). The strategic level consists of general principles by which SUE functions,
and these principles apply to all interrogation cases. Stemming out of this level is the
tactical level, which represents a toolbox of tactics that interrogators can employ on a
case-by-case basis. These tactics are categorized into the following: assessing the
evidence (evaluating the existing evidence pre-interrogation); posing questions
(variations of questions potentially posed); and disclosure of evidence (how evidence is
handled during questioning).
Figure 1. The SUE Model (Adapted from Granhag & Hartwig, 2015, p. 233)
Strategic Level

Tactical Level

Assessing
Evidence

Posing
Questions

Evidence
Disclosure

The Strategic Level. The strategic level of the SUE model encompasses four
principles. The first is suspects’ perception of the evidence, which relates back to the
previously discussed information control that suspects engage in as they attempt to
determine how much information (or evidence) the interrogator actually possesses.
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Suspects will presumably try to calibrate their perceptions of the evidence to match what
evidence the interrogator holds. In doing so, suspects may over- or underestimate the
amount of evidence held against them. Importantly, suspects’ perceptions of the evidence
against them can be influenced by tactics employed by interrogators, which can become
useful when eliciting cues to deception (as will be further discussed).
The second principle involves suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies, which
are related to Granhag and Hartwig’s (2008) previously discussed predictions about
suspects’ interrogation behaviors. In brief, innocent suspects are willing to tell the truth
and be forthcoming, while guilty suspects engage in avoidance (e.g., being vague,
omitting details) and escape (e.g., making denials) strategies. However, despite the
difference in applied strategies, both innocent and guilty suspects seek to convince the
interrogator that they are innocent.
The third principle is related to suspects’ verbal responses. Suspects’ statements
can provide interrogators with a wealth of information, including verbal cues to deception
and even new case-critical information. As related to SUE, the primary elicited deception
cue is statement-evidence inconsistencies (i.e., the extent to which a suspect’s statement
is inconsistent with the evidence known to the interrogator). In their systematic review,
Vredeveldt, van Koppen, and Granhag (2014) concluded that SUE tactics can be
employed to effectively enhance the difference between the number of statementevidence inconsistencies made by liars and truth tellers. Another relevant deception cue is
within-statement inconsistencies, which relates to the extent that the details in a suspect’s
statement are contradictory or change over the course of the interrogation. Again, SUE
tactics have been demonstrated to enhance the difference between liars’ and truth tellers’
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within-statement inconsistencies (Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). Specific
findings regarding statement-evidence and within-statement inconsistencies will be
further discussed in the context of the tactical level.
The fourth and final principle involves interrogators’ perspective-taking
regarding the three aforementioned principles. The efficacy of SUE is enhanced when
interrogators: consider how suspects might perceive the evidence against them; anticipate
the counter-interrogation strategies that suspects might employ; and think about the types
of verbal responses that will arise from suspects’ employed counter-interrogation
strategies. Ultimately, such perspective-taking can help interrogators formulate their own
questioning strategy.
As Granhag and Hartwig (2015) conclude, these four strategic principles are all
highly related. Specifically, a suspect will formulate a hypothesis regarding how much
evidence he thinks the interrogator holds against him. The suspect’s hypothesis will in
turn dictate the counter-interrogation strategies that the suspect decides to employ, and
these strategies will influence the verbal statements made by the suspect. Meanwhile, the
interrogator that is cognizant of the suspect’s engagement in strategizing will be better
able to predict the suspect’s strategies and the potential outcomes of those strategies, and
as such, will be more effective in his decision of how and when to employ SUE tactics.
The Tactical Level. The purpose of implementing SUE tactics is to influence
suspects’ perceptions of the evidence, which will in turn affect their counter-interrogation
strategies and, thus, verbal statements. As delineated by Hartwig et al. (2006),
determining which SUE tactics to use requires the interrogator to identify accessible
incriminating evidence prior to the interrogation. Such pre-interrogation planning enables
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interrogators to develop a line of strategic questioning that addresses the known evidence
without simultaneously disclosing it to suspects.
The SUE technique typically involves two types of questions: free recall and
specific questions. Free recall refers to an open-ended prompt that is meant to elicit a
general statement from suspects (e.g., “Please tell me everything that happened”). Such
prompts are designed to trigger guilty suspects to employ avoidant counter-interrogation
strategies (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Specific questions are questions that are
formulated in a manner that is meant to elicit information about a specific crime-relevant
detail (e.g., “Did you visit the library?” when the crime took place in the library). As
posited by Granhag and Hartwig (2015), these specific questions are meant to exhaust
any alternative explanations for the evidence that guilty suspects might concoct. Thus, in
order to formulate effective specific questions, interrogators must predict possible
explanations guilty suspects might have. Additionally, effective specific questions should
address the evidence that the interrogator holds, but not cue suspects to the fact that the
interrogator holds the evidence.
When used in conjunction with strategic evidence disclosure, free recall and
specific questions can elicit verbal cues to deception. Specifically, Hartwig et al. (2011)
had participants commit (guilty) or not commit (innocent) a mock crime, which they were
later accused of committing. Participants were then questioned by an interrogator who
used free recall, specific questions, or a combination of the two. In all conditions, the
interrogator withheld the evidence against the suspect until all questions had been asked
of and answered by participants. The results revealed that guilty participants omitted
more evidence-related details during free recall responses than did innocent participants.
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Additionally, guilty participants demonstrated more statement-evidence inconsistencies
than did innocent participants, with the largest effect size for this difference emerging
when participants were questioned with specific questions only. The difference was still
significant, but smaller, for participants questioned with the combination of questions.
The smallest (but still significant) difference emerged for those questioned with free
recall only.
In addition to strategizing about lines of questioning, the SUE technique involves
strategies on how and when to disclose evidence to suspects. There is a wide range of
possibilities as to when during an interrogation evidence can be disclosed to suspects.
The previously discussed early evidence disclosure technique represents the antithesis of
SUE, and researchers generally employ the early evidence disclosure method as the
control condition in SUE studies. Conversely, evidence can be disclosed after all
questions have been posed (late evidence disclosure; note that some researchers have
referred to this as SUE-Basic; e.g., Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & Hartwig, 2013).
Evidence can also be disclosed gradually throughout an interrogation, with evidence
being disclosed one piece at a time after questions relevant to a given piece of evidence
are posed and answered (e.g., Dando & Bull, 2011).
Timing of evidence disclosure differs from the manner in which the evidence is
disclosed. As postulated by Granhag (2010), a single piece of evidence can be framed
numerous ways along two dimensions: (1) strength of the source of the evidence (varies
from weak to strong) and (2) degree of precision of the evidence (varies from vague to
precise). Together, these dimensions form the Evidence Framing Matrix (EFM). To
illustrate this construct, consider an example presented by Hartwig et al. (2014). The
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evidence held by the interrogator is closed-circuit-television (CCTV) camera footage of
the suspect in the Grand Central Terminal in New York City. In regard to the first
dimension, the interrogator can disclose the source of his evidence (the CCTV footage) in
a vague (e.g., “we have information that…”) or precise (e.g., “we have CCTV footage
that…”) manner. Regarding the second dimension, the interrogator can manipulate the
suspect’s perception of how knowledgeable the interrogator is by directly stating he
knows the suspect was at the Grand Central Station (specific) or by being more general
(e.g., stating that he knows that the suspect was in Manhattan, in New York City, in the
tri-state region, and so on). Overall, the EFM is meant to enhance the identification of
liars, especially via increases in liars’ within-statement inconsistencies. As discussed,
liars will typically engage in avoidant strategies and offer little detail. Thus, when
interrogators present evidence in an increasingly precise and specific manner, liars will
presumably continually alter their statements so as to remain consistent with the evidence
as presented by the interrogator, all in an effort to appear innocent.
Tying the Strategic and Tactical Levels Together. Granhag and Hartwig (2015)
presented four associated phases (displayed in Table 1) in which SUE tactics are
employed as dictated by the interrogator’s perspective of the suspect’s perceptions of the
evidence and ensuing verbal statements. As the researchers note, these phases are very
basic and are not “fixed stages” within the SUE technique. Rather, these phases
conceptually represent how different SUE tactics can result in different outcomes. The
researchers also note that SUE is not restricted to these phases. Overall, these phases are
an ideal representation of how the discussed theory and principles come together to form
the SUE technique.
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Table 1. Basic Phases of the SUE Technique (Adapted from Granhag & Hartwig, 2015)
Phase 1
1. Suspect’s perception of the
evidence
2. SUE tactics
3. S’s perception of the evidence
4. S’s counter-interrogation strategy
5. S’s verbal responses

“They must have some information, but I am not
sure how much and what.’
Withhold the evidence; Ask for a free recall
“They do not mention any evidence; they might
have less than I thought.”
Avoid providing information that might be
incriminating.
Colored by omissions

Phase 2
6. S’s perception of the evidence
7. SUE tactics
8. S’s perception of the evidence
9. S’s counter-interrogation strategy
10. S’s verbal responses

“Still not very clear how much and what
information they hold.”
Withhold the evidence; Ask for a free recall;
Exhaust alternative explanations; Ask specific
questions
“They might have less information than I thought.”
Deny any incriminating actions
Colored by statement-evidence inconsistencies

Phase 3
11. S’s perception of the evidence
12. SUE tactics
13. S’s perception of the evidence
14. S’s counter-interrogation strategy
15. S’s verbal responses

“Still not very clear how much and what
information they hold.”
Withhold the evidence; Ask for a free recall;
Exhaust alternative explanations; Ask specific
questions; Disclosure according to the EFM
“They had more than I thought.”
“Need to alter my previous statement not to be
inconsistent with the evidence presented to me.”
Colored by within-statement inconsistencies

Phase 4
16. SUE tactic
17. S’s perception of the evidence
18. SUE tactics
19. S’s perception of the evidence
20. S’s counter-interrogation strategy
21. S’s verbal responses

S is confronted with within-statement and/or
statement-evidence inconsistencies
“They have more than I thought, better start
providing them with the information they already
have in order to avoid contradicting it.”
Introducing a new theme for which the interrogator
lacks critical information
“I am sure they hold more information on this theme
than they pretend.”
“Need to avoid being confronted with more
inconsistencies, better tell what they already know.”
Characterized by the suspect unintentionally telling
information that is new to the interrogator
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Moving from Theory to Practice: Empirical Studies
There is a growing amount of research being conducted on variations of the SUE
technique. Numerous studies have examined differences in timing of disclosure, framing
of the evidence, and methods by which interrogators address suspects’ inconsistencies as
evidence is presented throughout the course of the interrogation. Additional studies have
been conducted to test the effectiveness of SUE trainings for law enforcement in terms of
improving their deception detection accuracy. This section will review such studies, all of
which ultimately attest to the SUE technique’s efficacy in the context of suspect
interrogations.
Timing and Framing of Evidence Disclosure
In the seminal SUE study, Hartwig et al. (2005) posited that the strategic
manipulation of evidence presentation could function as an effective “tool” to detect
deception because it should result in an increase in liars’ statement-evidence
inconsistencies during questioning. To test SUE’s efficacy, the researchers employed a
mock crime paradigm in which liars and truth-tellers were sent to a video store to pick up
a DVD that was in fact not there. While searching for the DVD, both liars and truth
tellers touched a briefcase with a wallet sticking out of it. Liars had been instructed to
steal the exposed wallet, while truth-tellers had not. The mock crime employed created a
scenario in which three pieces of evidence, all of which were incriminating but still
ambiguous in terms of participants’ guilt, could be obtained for both guilty and innocent
suspects. Specifically, the evidence included the following: (1) a witness saw the suspect
outside of the store; (2) a witness saw the suspect inside of the store; and (3) the suspect’s
fingerprints were on the briefcase.
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All suspects were then accused of having stolen the wallet and were questioned
by an interrogator who used either an early disclosure or late disclosure (the latter
method represents SUE in its most basic form) technique. Prior to being interrogated,
lying suspects were told to lie about having committed the mock crime, and truth telling
suspects were told to offer a truthful account of what they had done; thus, as in all mock
crime studies, liars are guilty suspects and truth-tellers are innocent suspects. In the early
disclosure condition, after asking suspects whether they confessed to the crime, the
interrogator presented all evidence he possessed, then allowed suspects to comment on
the presented evidence before asking them to offer a free recall of what happened and
then asking specific questions formulated to force suspects to address the evidence.
Conversely, in the late disclosure condition, the interrogator asked for a free recall
statement, asked the evidence-specific questions, asked for a confession, then presented
all of the evidence at once, allowing suspects to subsequently comment on the presented
evidence.
To determine the efficacy of late disclosure, Hartwig et al. (2005) measured the
number of statement-evidence inconsistencies in suspects’ statements. Specifically, the
researchers coded suspects’ free recall statement for whether they addressed what the
interrogator knew based on the evidence, as well as coded for whether suspects’
responses to the evidence-specific questions were inconsistent with the evidence (e.g., the
suspect stated that he did not touch the briefcase, which contradicted the fingerprint
evidence). Additionally, the researchers had observers view the video recorded
interrogations and make a judgement regarding whether the suspect was lying or telling
the truth (i.e., had the suspect in fact stolen the wallet).
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The results were indicative of SUE’s benefits. In line with the postulation that
liars will make use of avoidant strategies, the researchers found that liars were more
likely than truth-tellers to not address details suggested by the evidence during free recall
in the late disclosure condition. The researchers also found that liars and truth-tellers
exhibited similar rates of statement-evidence inconsistencies when responding to
evidence-specific questions while being questioned with early disclosure; however, liars
were significantly more inconsistent than truth tellers when questioned with late
disclosure. Furthermore, observers who viewed late disclosure interrogations achieved
significantly higher deception detection accuracy rates (61.7%) than those who viewed
early disclosure interrogations (42.8%). While observers’ accuracy rates did not differ
between early and late disclosure interrogations for truth-tellers, observers were
significantly more accurate when viewing liars in late disclosure interrogations than in
early disclosure interrogations.
Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, Dawson, and Xhihani (2012) also found that late
evidence disclosure outperformed early evidence disclosure. After employing a mock
crime paradigm similar to that employed by Hartwig et al. (2005), the researchers found
that guilty suspects generally exhibited more statement-evidence inconsistencies that did
innocent suspects. Notably, this difference was substantially larger when suspects were
questioned with late disclosure than with early disclosure techniques.
Subsequent studies have further expanded upon disclosure timing conditions, as
well as on how evidence was framed. For example, Dando, Bull, Ormerod, and Sandham
(2015; first published 2013) deviated from the typical mock crime paradigm and instead
used an interactive computer game in which participants either built part of an Olympic
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stadium (truth-tellers) or blew up the stadium (liars). Participants were then interviewed
with one of the following techniques: (1) early disclosure; (2) late disclosure; or (3)
gradual disclosure (i.e., the evidence was revealed one piece at a time, with suspects
having to address each piece of evidence as it was revealed and the interrogator
challenging any contradictions). Unfortunately, the researchers did not assess verbal cues
to deception, and only examined observers’ deception detection accuracy. The results
demonstrated that observers were more accurate when they viewed gradual interviews
than either early or late interviews; however, the effect of disclosure method did not
interact with suspect culpability.
Although Dando et al. (2015) did not assess how gradual disclosure affects guilty
and innocent suspects’ verbal statements, Sorochinski et al.’s (2014) study did address
this topic. The researchers had participants engage (or not engage) in a mock crime and
then submit to questioning on the suspicion that they were involved in a terrorist activity.
Suspects were questioned with an early, late, or gradual disclosure technique. Note that
the researchers’ defined their gradual technique as starting with a free recall, asking
evidence-specific questions, then presenting the relevant piece of evidence, repeating this
process for each set of evidence pieces. Findings revealed that guilty suspects omitted
more crime-relevant details during their free recall than did innocent suspects (the
researchers did not assess if this differed by disclosure condition). Furthermore, guilty
suspects demonstrated more statement-evidence inconsistencies than did innocent
suspects when a late disclosure technique was used, but no differences between guilty
and innocent suspects emerged for the early and gradual disclosure techniques.
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The lack of difference between innocent and guilty suspects in Sorochinski et al.’s
(2014) gradual condition is surprising. As the researchers noted, this was not the result of
a decrease in guilty inconsistencies, but rather to an increase in innocent inconsistencies.
As such, the researchers cautioned that innocent suspects questioned with a gradual
disclosure technique realize that there is mounting evidence against them and thus begin
to employ aversive strategies (e.g., try to distance themselves from the crime scene by
contradicting known evidence), thereby acting more like guilty suspects. However,
Sorochinski et al.’s (2014) finding diverged from Dando et al.’s (2015) finding that
gradual disclosure was effective in increasing deception detection accuracy. Sorochinski
et al. (2014) concluded that more research on matter is needed.
Although Dando et al.’s (2015) and Sorochinski et al.’s (2014) results attest to the
effects of gradual disclosure, they did not offer insight on the effect of evidence framing.
It is important to consider studies that address how framing evidence influences suspects’
statements (i.e., Granhag et al., 2013; Luke et al., 2013). In Granhag et al.’s (2013) study,
participants who had engaged in a mock crime (stole a book) or had not (checked the
price of a book) were questioned with one of three techniques: (1) early disclosure; (2)
late disclosure; or (3) incremental disclosure (SUE-Incremental, or SUE-I). Importantly,
interrogators in this study had only one piece of evidence: incriminating, yet ambiguous,
surveillance footage showing the suspect touching books on the shelf from which the
book in question was stolen (but not actually showing whether the participant indeed
stole the book). The SUE-I condition was characterized by incrementally presenting this
one piece of evidence in three-steps, starting off vaguely (e.g., “We have information that
you were there”) and gradually moving to more specific (e.g., “We know you were there
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because we have surveillance footage”). Examination of statement-evidence
inconsistencies revealed that guilty suspects were more inconsistent than innocent
suspects and late disclosure and SUE-I enhanced the difference between guilty and
innocent suspects to a greater extent than did early disclosure. Additionally, guilty
suspects demonstrated more within-statement inconsistencies than did innocent suspects,
with this difference being largest when they were questioned with SUE-I, smaller (but
still statistically significant) when they were questioned with late disclosure, and nonsignificant when they were questioned with early disclosure.
Luke et al. (2013) further expanded the evidence framing literature. Similar to
Granhag et al.’s (2013) study, guilty and innocent suspects were questioned after
committing or not committing a mock crime. Again, participants were questioned with
either early, late, or gradual disclosure of a single piece of evidence (i.e., surveillance
footage). However, novel to this study was that gradual disclosure either occurred in a
two-step or four-step manner (for comparison, Granhag et al., 2013, presented the
evidence in three steps). Not surprisingly, liars’ statements contained more statementevidence inconsistencies than truth-tellers’ statements, regardless of interview style.
However, the extent to which guilty and innocent suspects differed varied by disclosure
method, as this difference was larger when the late disclosure and four-step methods were
used compared to the early disclosure and two-step methods.
Summary. Taken together, the literature indicates that early disclosure is
detrimental to interrogators’ efforts to distinguish between guilty and innocent suspects.
This is because liars and truth tellers behave similarly when evidence is presented early:
They both integrate the evidence into their free recall statements and do not contradict the
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evidence when they are asked evidence-specific questions. However, late evidence
disclosure appears to consistently outperform early disclosure, both in terms of eliciting
cues to deception in suspects’ verbal statements and increasing observers’ deception
detection accuracy. Furthermore, gradual disclosure generally emerges as an effective
method; however, there are some mixed results concerning this technique and more
research is required.
Training SUE
Beyond being effective in enhancing the difference between guilty and innocent
suspects, the SUE technique can also be effectively trained to law enforcement agents.
For example, Hartwig et al. (2006) either trained or did not train 82 police trainees in
methods of strategically using evidence during suspect questioning. The training session,
which lasted three hours, included presentation of SUE’s foundation and video examples
of early and late disclosure methods. Additionally, trainees were guided on how to
pinpoint incriminating information from a case file and how to use that information
during questioning (i.e., develop evidence-specific questions). Lastly, trainees practiced
implementing the SUE technique with one another using different case files.
Next, trained and untrained police trainees questioned suspects who had or had
not committed a mock crime. Assessment of the interviews revealed that trained
interviewers conducted their interviews in line with the SUE training that they had
received. Furthermore, the difference between the number of statement-evidence
inconsistencies made by guilty and innocent suspects was greater when suspects were
questioned by a trained interviewer than an untrained interviewer. Liars specifically were
more inconsistent when questioned by trained versus untrained interviewers.
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Additionally, trained interviewers’ veracity judgments were significantly more accurate
than untrained interviewers’ judgments. Specifically, trained interviewers’ overall
accuracy score was 85.4%, while untrained interviewers’ score was 56.1%.
In another study, five experienced police officers were trained in three evidence
disclosure techniques (early disclosure, late disclosure, and gradual disclosure), and then
questioned mock suspects (Dando & Bull, 2011). Results revealed that when they used
the gradual disclosure technique, interviewers achieved deception detection accuracy
rates of 67% for liars and 74% for truth tellers. Accuracy rates were lower when late
disclosure (54% for liars; 42% for truth tellers) and early disclosure (53% for liars; 47%
for truth tellers) methods were used. Furthermore, the interviewers were more confident
in their judgments and more likely to rely on suspects’ verbal behaviors when they used
the gradual technique than either the late or early technique.
Yet another training study attests to SUE’s benefits. Luke et al. (2016) trained 59
law enforcement interviewers in the SUE technique, with a specific focus on applying the
“funnel” structure of questioning. Specifically, this funnel method of strategic
questioning involves interrogators first asking very broad questions (e.g., free recall) as
related to held evidence, and becoming increasingly more specific in their subsequent
evidence-specific questions (Hartwig et al., 2014). Results revealed that trained
interviewers made greater use of a funnel-structure line of questioning and withheld
evidence until after questioning to a greater extent than did untrained interviewers.
Additionally, guilty suspects demonstrated more statement-evidence inconsistencies than
did innocent suspects when they were questioned by trained interviewers—a finding that
did not emerge when guilty and innocent suspects were questioned by untrained

35

interviewers. Furthermore, trained interviewers demonstrated higher deception detection
accuracy (64.5%) than did untrained interviewers (42.9%). Considering these results in
conjunction with those of Hartwig et al. (2006) and Dando and Bull (2011), it is apparent
that the SUE technique can be effectively trained and can enhance interrogators’
deception detection accuracy.
More Recent SUE Variations
Although the studies discussed so far attest to SUE’s efficacy in enhancing the
difference between liars and truth-tellers, they do not address an important goal of
investigative interviewing: to have all suspects, both innocent and guilty, be forthcoming.
As discussed previously, innocent suspects are generally forthcoming, but guilty suspects
typically engage in avoidant and denial strategies. However, manipulations of guilty
suspects’ perception of the evidence can induce guilty suspects into becoming more
forthcoming. Indeed, Luke, Dawson, Hartwig, and Granhag (2014) found that guilty
suspects who were informed before their interview that the investigative team might have
incriminating evidence were more forthcoming than uninformed guilty suspects,
indicating that suspects’ perceptions of the evidence against them are malleable.
Considering Luke et al.’s (2014) findings, Tekin et al. (2015) set out to extend the
use of SUE to shifting guilty suspects from being avoidant to more forthcoming, and
especially so in the context of offering guilty admissions (i.e., critical information that
indicates a link between the suspect and the crime; note that this differs from a
confession, in which a suspect explicitly takes responsibility for the crime). The
researchers therefore developed the SUE-Confrontation (SUE-C) technique. Using the
SUE-C technique, interrogators employ the basic SUE strategies (i.e., free recall,
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evidence-specific questions) before disclosing the evidence and explicitly point out any
inconsistencies between the suspect’s statement and the evidence. Interrogators repeat
this sequence for each piece of incriminating evidence that they hold. Tekin et al. (2015)
predicted that this method would shift guilty suspects from avoidance/denial strategies
towards forthcomingness as the suspects recognize that the interrogators do indeed have
evidence against them and do not want to be inconsistent with this evidence at the risk of
being perceived as liars. Consistent with Tekin et al.’s (2015) prediction, the researchers
found that guilty suspects interviewed with SUE-C were more likely to offer selfincriminating information than those interviewed with either early or no evidence
disclosure methods. The benefits of SUE-C were further bolstered by the finding that
SUE-C elicited from guilty suspects more statement-evidence inconsistencies than did
early disclosure.
Further building on SUE-C, Tekin et al. (2016) introduced SUEConfrontational/Explain (SUE-C/E) and May, Granhag, and Tekin (2017) introduced
SUE-Introduce-Present-Respond (SUE-IPR; note that both studies only testing these new
variations on guilty, and not innocent, suspects). Unlike SUE-C, both SUE-C/E and SUEIPR give suspects the chance to explain any inconsistencies between their statements and
the evidence after the inconsistencies are pointed out to them, with the difference
between these two methods being that there is a rapport-building introductory phase in
SUE-IPR that is missing from SUE-C/E. Lending to support for SUE-C/E, Tekin et al.
(2016) demonstrated that both SUE-C and SUE-C/E resulted in more statement-evidence
inconsistencies than did early disclosure. However, only SUE-C was found to result in
more guilty admissions, outperforming both SUE-C/E and early disclosure. The

37

researchers speculated that this finding could have been due to some of the suspects
questioned with SUE-C/E believing that they had failed at achieving their goal of
convincing the interrogator of their innocence on the basis of the fact that the interrogator
stressed the detrimental effect any arising inconsistencies had on the suspects’ credibility.
As such, May et al. (2017) formulated SUE-IPR to give suspects the chance to comment
on any inconsistencies, but in a non-guilt-presumptive manner (i.e., inconsistencies were
not explicitly pointed out to be detrimental to the suspect’s credibility, as they are in
SUE-C/E). The researchers found that both SUE-C and SUE-IPR resulted in more
statement-evidence inconsistencies elicited from guilty suspects, as compared to early
disclosure. Additionally, SUE-IPR resulted in more new information being elicited from
guilty suspects than did early disclosure, with the amount of new information elicited
with SUE-C not differing from the amount elicited with SUE-IPR or early disclosure.
Overall, these studies highlight the possible benefits associated with having
interrogators explicitly point out inconsistencies in suspects’ statements (i.e., SUE-C,
SUE-C/E, and SUE-IPR), especially in regard to enhancing statement-evidence
inconsistencies. However, the extent to which allowing suspects to explain any
inconsistencies is effective in shifting suspects to be more forthcoming remains
ambiguous, as support for this is found with SUE-IPR but not SUE-C/E. Regardless,
SUE-C/E should not be so quickly dismissed because, similar to SUE-IPR, it is
characterized by greater ecological validity than is SUE-C (i.e., suspects are often given
the opportunity by investigators to explain discrepancies in their statements; Walsh &
Bull, 2015). Additionally, the existing research on SUE-C/E, and even SUE-C, is sparse,
and methodological decisions made by Tekin et al. (2015; 2016) and May et al. (2017)
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have rendered an incomplete picture of the benefits (and potential pitfalls) of the SUE
confrontation variations. Thus, the present studies sought to further contribute to the
research on these methods, as well as address past methodological concerns.
The Present Research
The reviewed literature indicates that the traditional method of early evidence
disclosure is ineffective when employed during suspect interrogations when seeking to
detect deception. Fortunately, the SUE technique presents itself as a valuable alternative
to the early evidence disclosure method. However, the need remains for more externallyvalid research on the SUE technique in the interrogative context and in relation to
confession decisions, as past empirical interrogation and confession research has
primarily focused on testing the effects of detrimental methods (e.g., evidence polys and
bluffs). The present research aimed to address this need, as well as address other topics
that have yet to be examined in the SUE literature.
Addressing Gaps in the Existing Research
While past research provides a solid foundation on which the present research was
built, there are five key elements of the SUE research narrative that are missing and
require empirical assessment. The goal of Study 1 and Study 2 was to address these gaps.
(1) Research on the relationship between the SUE technique and confession
behaviors is lacking. Thus far, only two studies have examined confession rates elicited
via the implementation of SUE. Specifically, Sellers and Kebbell (2009) manipulated
evidence strength (weak or strong) and evidence disclosure timing (early or late) during
the interrogations of guilty suspects who had committed a mock crime. Results revealed
that confession rates were higher when the evidence was strong and when late disclosure
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was used, as compared to when the evidence was weak or when early disclosure was
used. Jordan et al. (2012) also examined both guilty and innocent mock suspects’
confession behaviors in relation to early and late evidence disclosure. However, the
resulting confession rates were extremely low (11.1%), and any further analyses of
confession behaviors were not appropriate. Although these two studies did address
confession behaviors, only early versus late disclosure conditions were examined, Sellers
and Kebbell (2009) did not compare guilty and innocent suspects, and all participants in
both studies were aware that they were involved in a mock crime/interview that was part
of the experimental procedures. Thus, there is a need to examine confession behaviors
while addressing the latter pitfalls in the past research. By examining confession rates as
an outcome variable in the present research, findings can contribute to the achievement of
societally relevant outcomes, as the implementation of an evidence-based interrogation
method, such as SUE, should presumably lead to a decrease in false confessions, and
thus, miscarriages of justice.
(2) None of the SUE variations have been tested with an interrogation paradigm
characterized by psychological realism, which enables the examination of suspects who
have (or have not) committed a transgression on their own volition (i.e., a transgression
that is not known to be “part of the study”). All SUE studies to date have employed some
variation of a mock crime paradigm: Participants were explicitly told by research teams
to engage in guilty or innocent behaviors, guilty participants knew that the crime they
were committing was fake (e.g. “go to the movie store and steal the wallet from the
briefcase on top of the box of DVDs”), and participants were aware that no serious
consequences would stem from their interrogations. Even though participants in such
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paradigms reported being motivated to lie or tell the truth, findings arguably lack
generalizability to criminal interrogation contexts. The lack of generalizability is due to
the fact that “guilty” participants in these mock-crime studies, unlike real life suspects, do
not engage in conscious transgressions with serious consequences. Thus, it is important
that SUE be tested using a psychologically real paradigm, which will enhance the
relevance of the findings to professional investigators and thereby facilitate cooperation
between scientists and practitioners in the pursuit of effective, evidence-based
interrogation methods.
(3) SUE-C and SUE-C/E have yet to be tested with innocent suspects in any
context. Tekin et al. (2015; 2016) noted that they only studied guilty mock suspects
because innocent suspects have been demonstrated to be forthcoming and consistent with
the evidence, regardless of the type of evidence disclosure method used. However, the
researchers neglected the fallibility of human memory, as even witnesses willing to offer
information make memory errors or simply forget to mention certain details (Vrij, Hope,
& Fisher, 2014). Thus, denying innocent suspects the chance to explain inconsistencies,
as in the case with SUE-C (but not SUE-C/E), might be detrimental to the credibility of
their statements because their statements may be rendered similar to those of guilty
suspects (e.g., innocent suspects might have incorrectly recalled a detail that is
inconsistent with the evidence, thus making them appear guiltier). Studying both innocent
and guilty suspects can thus advance the understanding of how innocent and guilty
suspects will (not) differentially behave in light of implementing SUE-C and SUE-C/E.
(4) SUE-C and SUE-C/E have yet to be compared to late disclosure, which
represents SUE in its most basic form (i.e., all evidence is presented at once after
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investigators ask all questions). Comparing SUE-C and SUE-C/E to late disclosure is
important because implementation of these confrontation-based SUE variations in the
field would require more training than would the relatively simple late disclosure
variation. Should late disclosure perform on par with the other SUE variations, it would
be preferable to law enforcement because of reduced training time commitments.
(5) Observers’ culpability judgments of participants interrogated with SUE in a
psychologically real interrogation experimental procedure have yet to be examined. Nor
have their culpability judgments been assessed in any context when participant suspects
are questioned using SUE-C and SUE-C/E. SUE has been shown to increase police
trainees’ accuracy rates to as high as 85.4% (Hartwig et al., 2006), as well as improve
laypersons’ deception detection accuracy (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2005; Jordan et al., 2012).
However, it is unknown whether these high accuracy rates will be maintained when
observers are viewing participant suspects who had been subjected to a psychologically
real interrogation. Addressing this gap is particularly important because past SUE studies
examining observers’ deception detection accuracy lacked key elements associated with
real-world criminal investigations: Mock crime suspects do not have a self-generated
motive to lie and, if guilty, are instructed to lie rather than given the self-selected choice
to lie or tell the truth (Levine, 2018). These two latter points may result in instructed lies
not being reflective of lies rendered in the real-world and may have implications for
observers’ ability to make accurate culpability assessments (Levine, 2018). Additionally,
it is unknown whether SUE-C or SUE-C/E will further enhance culpability accuracy
rates. If SUE-C and/or SUE-C/E result in lower culpability accuracy rates, it will be
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important that further evaluation of these methods is conducted before recommendations
are made to law enforcement professionals.
II. STUDY 1
Study 1 examined four evidence disclosure methods (early disclosure, late
disclosure, SUE-C, SUE-C/E) during the interrogations of participants who had or had
not committed transgressions on their own volition during a modified version of Evans et
al.’s (2013) interrogation cheating paradigm. Note that early disclosure served as the
“control” condition, as it is a typically employed interrogation strategy (Leo, 1996); yet
most, if not all, SUE studies have already demonstrated its inferiority in terms of eliciting
reliable cues to deception. Study 1’s research questions and associated hypotheses were
as follows:
(1) Is the SUE technique more diagnostic (as related to confessions) than the
traditional early disclosure method (i.e., does SUE result in more true
confessions and fewer false confessions, compared to early disclosure)? I
predicted that confessions would be more diagnostic in the three SUE
conditions than in the early disclosure condition. Empirical examination of
Gudjonsson’s (2003) Cognitive-Behavioral model of confessions indicates
that true confessions are related to perceived evidence strength—a perception
that all SUE techniques aim to manipulate. Further, I predicted that SUE-C/E
would result in even more diagnostic confessions than would the SUE-C and
late disclosure conditions. This is because SUE-C/E’s explanation component
would offer an extra protective layer for innocent suspects whose memory
might have failed them (this component is lacking in SUE-C). Additionally,
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by the end of the interrogation, innocent suspects might not remember all of
the inconsistencies they made throughout the interrogation (which they would
have to explain all at once at the conclusion of questioning in the late
disclosure condition). Instead, innocent suspects may have an easier time
explaining inconsistencies when inconsistencies are incrementally presented
(as in the SUE-C/E condition). I also predicted that late disclosure would
outperform SUE-C in terms of diagnosticity, as suspects would still get the
chance to explain inconsistencies after all of the evidence has been presented
to them, thereby giving them a chance to reinforce their innocence.
(2) Can SUE techniques yield statements with more inconsistencies compared to
early disclosure in more realistic questioning scenarios? I predicted that all
three SUE methods would result in more statement-evidence inconsistencies
than would early disclosure—a prediction that is in line with the reviewed
research. Furthermore, I predicted that the SUE methods would result in guilty
participants making more statement-evidence inconsistencies than would
innocent participants; early disclosure would not, however, result in
significant differences in statement-evidence inconsistencies between guilty
and innocent participants. I also predicted SUE-C and SUE-C/E to perform
similarly (as demonstrated by Tekin et al.’s, 2016, results). Lastly, I predicted
that both SUE-C and SUE-C/E would result in overall fewer statementevidence inconsistencies compared to late disclosure. This prediction is
supported by self-regulation theory, as guilty suspects’ avoidance/denial
strategies were expected to shift to forthcoming strategies as they attempted to
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regain their credibility in the SUE-C and SUE-C/E conditions. The expected
shift to forthcoming strategies, which is in line with Tekin et al.’s (2016)
findings and was not expected to occur in the late disclosure condition, would
thus presumably result in fewer statement-evidence inconsistencies in the
SUE-C and SUE-C/E conditions.
Method
Participant Recruitment and Sample Size
I recruited adult participants (N = 219) via flyers, online platforms, and snowball
sampling. Research assistants posted the flyers throughout communities in Miami-Dade
and Broward counties, and the Miami-Dade County public library system agreed to
display flyers in all 50 of their branches. Additionally, I posted the recruitment notice on
online platforms including Craigslist, Eventbrite, OfferUp, and Nextdoor. All
advertisements denoted that the study was part of a national assessment of general
knowledge, thereby masking the true nature of the study and facilitating psychological
realism during the interrogation phase of the study. The advertisements instructed
participants to either call or email the research team to set up a study appointment, as
well as indicated that participants would be compensated $30, with the opportunity of
receiving an extra $10 (for a total of $40; note: participants also received a $2 travel
compensation). In reality, however, all participants received the full $42 (the falsely
advertised $30 with the chance to earn more money was integral for the research design,
as discussed below).
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Participant Sample Characteristics
Eighteen participants either withdrew their consent for the usage of all their data
(both paper and video) for the present study or did not complete the study (e.g., the study
was stopped because the participant became too upset, the interrogator personally knew
the participant); thus, the total sample size for all analyses (other than those analyses
dependent on the video footage of the interrogation) was 201. The total sample size of the
video recordings collected was 191, as there were no videos for 10 participants for the
following reasons: some participants withdrew consent for use of their videos
specifically; the recording system failed to record the interrogation session; or the
recordings were corrupted.
Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 80-years-old (M = 41, SD = 15; n = 1983).
Overall, the participant sample was diverse (n = 196): 37.8% participants identified as
Hispanic/Latinx, 29.6% as Black, 24.0% as White, 1.5% as Asian, 1.5% as Native
American, and 5.6% as Other. A little over half of participants were male (56.7%; n =
194). The majority of the participant sample were not students (79.8%; n = 198) and
indicated that they were fluent in English (99.0%; n = 198). Additionally, a large portion
of the sample indicated that they were currently not employed (46.5%; n = 198), with the
remainder of the sample indicating that they were either employed less than 15
hours/week (8.1%), employed 15 to 35 hours/week (19.7%), or employed fulltime
(25.8%).

3

Not all participants chose to respond to demographic questions. The total number of participants who
responded to each question is therefore listed with the corresponding results.
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Arrest and Interrogation Experiences. Of the 198 participants who responded
regarding whether they had ever been arrested, 51.5% indicated that they have previously
been arrested. Table 2 displays the number of times participants indicated that they had
been arrested. Additionally, participants who had been previously arrested indicated
whether they had been interrogated by a police officer after being arrested.4 Of the 67
participants who had been arrested and responded to this question, 61.2% indicated that
they had indeed been interrogated by a police officer (Table 2 displays the number of
times participants had been interrogated). Those participants who had been interrogated
also indicated whether or not they had confessed during an interrogation and, if so, how
many times they had truthfully and/or falsely confessed. Of the 41 participants who
reported that they had been interrogated, 31.7% had confessed. Table 2 displays the
breakdown of the number of times these confessors had made a truthful and/or false
confession.

4

I added interrogation detail questions to the demographic questionnaire after data collection had already
begun; thus, not all participants who had been arrested responded to these interrogation-related questions.
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Table 2. Participants’ Arrest and Interrogation Self-Reported Details
Number of
Participants Who
Responded

Category

% of Total
Participants Who
Responded

Number of Times Arrested (n = 99)
1 time
30
30.3%
2–5 times
43
43.4%
6–10 times
12
12.1%
More than 10 times
10
10.1%
No exact number*
4
4.0%
Number of Times Interrogated (n = 40)
1 time
16
40.0%
2–5 times
19
47.5%
6–10 times
2
5.0%
More than 10 times
3
7.5%
Number of Times Made a Truthful Confession (n = 13)
Never
1
7.7%
1 time
4
30.8%
2 times
3
23.1%
3 times
3
23.1%
4 times
2
15.4%
Number of Times Made a False Confession (n = 13)
Never
6
46.2%
1 time
4
30.8%
2 times
1
7.7%
6 times
1
7.7%
More than 10 times
1
7.7%
Note. * These participants gave responses such as “don’t remember” and “a lot.”
Design
Study 1 implemented a 2 (culpability: guilty, innocent) x 4 (evidence disclosure:
Early disclosure, Late disclosure, SUE-Confrontation, SUE-Confrontation/Explain)
between-subjects design. Primary outcome variables included confession rate, statementevidence inconsistencies, and participant subjective ratings for their perceptions of the
evidence and the interrogation strategies that they employed.
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Materials
Psychologically Realistic Cheating and Interrogation Paradigm
One participant was run per experimental session. Participants arrived at the lab
along with a research assistant posing as another participant (i.e., a confederate5). An
experimenter greeted them and proceeded with the consent process, which was consistent
with the recruitment cover story in order to mask the true nature of the study. After
obtaining consent, the experimenter directed the pair to leave all their belongings in the
main lab room before leading them to the testing room where the remainder of the study
took place. The testing room had a one-way mirror and was wired to covertly video and
audio record everything that took place during the experimental session. Participants
were unaware that they were being recorded at this point.
Next, I implemented a variation of the Evans et al. (2013) paradigm. Specifically,
the experimenter informed the participant-confederate pair that they would be
participating in a government-funded national research project headed by the Department
of Educational Assessment,6 and that the goal of the project was to determine the status
of general knowledge among community members. The experimenter further indicated
that the first part of the study consisted of answering 20 general knowledge questions,
and that the pair “need[ed] to work alone on answering these questions” and “[could not]
use any additional resources, such as cellphones, or help each other while working on
these questions.” Lastly, the experimenter informed the pair that they had the chance to

5

Over the course of data collection, the confederate role was assumed by both male and female research
assistants. The pronoun “he” is used here only to enhance readability.
6

This was a fictional government department created for the purpose of this experiment.
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receive up to an additional $10, as they each would be paid $0.50 for every question they
answered correctly.7 The experimenter then administered the test, provided the pair with
some additional scrap papers, and left them alone in the room, stating that she would
return in about 15 minutes to check on the pair’s progress.
Guilty Condition. A couple of minutes after the experimenter left, a cellphone
dinged, and the confederate retrieved it from his pocket and pulled up a photo of a paper
with answers to the test questions. The confederate placed the phone on the desk and
began to copy down the answers. He told participants that his friend had already
participated in the study and gave him the questions. He then stated that he really needed
all the money he could get so that he would be able to pay his bills this month, and thus
he had looked up all the answers beforehand. After completing his test via copying the
answers off his phone, the confederate pushed the phone in front of participants, asking
participants if they wanted to use the “cheat sheet.” Participants, assuming that they used
the cellphone, were then guilty of engaging in a forbidden behavior (i.e., using an
additional resource to cheat).8 Once the confederate took the phone back, he took pictures
of the test and stated that he sent the pictures to participants,9 suggesting that participants
could share the answers with friends so that they, too, could sign up for the study and
make the extra $10.

7

As previously noted, all participants received the full $40, regardless of their performance on the test.

8

Not all participants in the guilty condition chose to use cheat using the phone. This fact is accounted for in
the Results section.
9

In reality, the confederate did not send participants the answers. If participants asked how the confederate
got their contact information, the confederate indicated that their email address was listed on the study
reminder email.
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Innocent Condition. As in the guilty condition, after the experimenter left the
testing room a cellphone dinged, and the confederate retrieved it from his pocket and
placed it on the desk next to him. The confederate told participants that he really needed
all the money he could get to pay his bills, so it was important that he figure out all the
correct answers to the test questions. The pair then worked on the test questions while the
phone remained on the desk. Upon completing the questions, the confederate picked up
the phone and pulled up a photo of a piece of paper on which illegible text was scribbled.
The confederate stated that his roommate had sent him a grocery list of items they needed
at home, but that he could not decipher the list. Then, asking if they could read the
grocery list and write it down on a piece of scrap paper, the confederate pushed the phone
in front of participants. Thus, participants were innocent of engaging in any forbidden
behaviors (i.e., they were not using additional resources to cheat), but critically, were still
interacting with a cellphone and subsequently writing something down. After participants
wrote down the grocery list, the confederate folded the paper and pocketed it. The
confederate then took pictures of the test, indicating that he was sending the test
questions to a friend that would be taking the study at a later point. Note that if
participants in the innocent condition suggested using the phone to cheat at any time, the
confederate would reiterate the experimenter’s instructions.
Pre-Interrogation Phase. The experimenter returned after approximately 15
minutes (by which time the confederate had replaced the cellphone in his pocket) and
stated that the pair would separately engage in an individual computer task. The
experimenter then escorted the confederate out of the testing room, giving participants a
questionnaire and new puzzle task to work on while they were waiting for their turn at the

51

computer task. Soon after, an interrogator,10 blind to participant culpability, entered the
testing room. He informed the participants that there was an issue with the test that they
just turned in and that he would return shortly to discuss the issue. He then administered
another questionnaire to participants in order to “keep the study going” and left. After
five minutes, the interrogator returned, and the interrogation portion of the study
commenced.
Interrogation Phase. The interrogator began the interrogation with the same
scripted opening statement, regardless of whether or not participants had actually
cheated. Specifically, the interrogator stated that he had a reasonable suspicion that the
participant-confederate pair cheated on the test. The interrogator further stated that
cheating on this government-issued test was a major issue, and that the administration
protocol sent from the Department of Educational Assessment indicated that cheating
was considered to be the provision of fraudulent responses, which could ultimately result
in a monetary fine of $50–$500 depending on the severity of the cheating.
The interrogator then followed a randomly assigned protocol consistent with one
of the four evidence presentation conditions (Early disclosure, Late disclosure, SUE-C,
SUE-C/E). Note that all interrogators underwent extensive SUE training in line with past
SUE training studies (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2006; Luke et al., 2016).11 Specifically,
interrogators were trained in the following: basic understanding of SUE’s foundation;

10

Over the course of data collection, the interrogator role was assumed by primarily male research
assistants. The pronoun “he” is used here to enhance readability.
11

I did not inform interrogators about any of my hypotheses, so as to prevent experimenter expectancy
effects.
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specifics about each of the four techniques and how to apply the techniques; and how
lines of questioning are developed in relation to each piece of evidence that exists for a
case. Additionally, interrogators learned the specifics about the study’s case, including
what evidence would exist and the types of questions that should be associated with the
evidence, and then practiced the four techniques on mock participants until they were
able to complete interrogations in a believable and effective manner.
The same four evidence pieces existed for both culpability conditions (Table 3).12
Crucially, all evidence was incriminating but not absolutely indicative of cheating (i.e.,
guilt was ambiguous). Indeed, the evidence was consistent with both innocent and guilty
participants’ behaviors.

12

In some participant cases, not all evidence pieces occurred. This happened primarily for Evidence Piece
#4 when participants had strong negative reactions to the phone and would immediately push it out of their
vicinity. Such instances are addressed in the analyses.
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Table 3. Evidence Specifics and Related Specific Questions
Evidence
Piece
#1

#2

#3

#4

Evidence Specifics

Related Specific Questions

Did you hear any
A research assistant from a different study
unexpected sounds, for a
(Witness 1) heard a phone go off in the testing
test setting, while you were
room as she walked by.
taking the test?
Other than the pen and
Another research assistant (Witness 2) went
scrap paper the
into the room next door to the testing room to
experimenter gave you,
get a folder. When he was looking for the
were there any additional
folder, he said that he happened to look
resources in this testing
through the one-way glass and saw a phone
room that weren’t supposed
sitting on the table.
to be here?
Because Witness 2 could not find the folder he [Did you use or have access
was looking for, he asked another research
to / Were you in the vicinity
assistant (Witness 3) to find it. Witness 3 said of] any additional resources
that when she entered the room next door to the that weren’t allowed at any
testing room, she saw that the person sitting the point during the testing
farthest from the door was holding a phone.* session?
Witness 3 said that she found her folder after
searching for a bit, and when she looked into
Were you writing anything
the testing room again, she saw the participant
down while using or
writing something down while looking at the
accessing any additional
phone. She thought it was odd, considering the
resources that weren’t
participant was in a testing setting, so she took
allowed?
a picture of the participant writing something
down while looking at the phone.

Note. The witnesses are fictional. The experimenter observed the entire testing session
and recorded the evidence as it occurred. Also, interrogators reworded the evidencerelated questions according to participant responses so that questioning would not seem
artificial, as well as in a manner to ensure that the evidence-related questions matched
exactly how the evidence had played out during the testing session. *The participant
was always the person to be sitting farthest from the door.
In the SUE-C/E condition (see Figure 2), the interrogator first asked a free recall
question (“So, in as much detail as possible, please tell me everything that happened from
the time you arrived here at the lab up until I entered the room.”). Following participants’
responses, the interrogator then posed Specific Question #1. If participants’ responses
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were characterized by denial (“I didn’t hear anything”), the interrogator presented
Evidence Piece #1 and, in a non-accusatory manner that did not indicate presumption of
guilt, stressed the seriousness of concealing information13 (“We have a witness saying
that she heard a phone in the room. Considering this, it seems to me that you’re not
matching up with what the research assistant told me, which is a bit strange.”).
Conversely, if participants’ responses were characterized by complete agreement with the
evidence (“I heard a phone go off”), the interrogator would confirm a match (“You say
you heard a phone ding, and we have a witness confirming this”). For instances in which
participants indicated vague agreement with the evidence (e.g., “yes” or “I heard
something”), the interrogator would follow up with an open invitation (“What did you
hear?”). The interrogator confirmed a match if participants’ responses to this open
invitation were evidence-consistent. However, if any information was omitted or
inconsistent in response to the open invitation, the interrogator would confront
participants with the evidence and stress the gravity of the situation in the same manner
as if the participant had denied hearing anything at all.
After any instance of evidence confrontation that resulted in statement-evidence
inconsistencies, the interrogator would ask participants to explain the inconsistencies
(“Why aren’t you matching up with the evidence that I have?”). The interrogator would
confirm participant explanations that were consistent with the evidence, but if participant
explanations remained inconsistent with the evidence (“I really didn’t hear a phone”), the
interrogator would again stress the severity of persisting inconsistency (“You’re still not

13

This method of confrontation is similar to that employed in SUE-IPR; however, I was not testing SUEIPR, which involves an additional introductory phase that was not tested in this study.
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matching up with the evidence, and that doesn’t make sense”). This process was repeated
for all four evidence pieces.
Figure 2. The SUE-C/E Questioning Process

The SUE-C condition was identical to the SUE-C/E condition, except that
participants were not given the opportunity to address any statement-evidence
inconsistencies that were pointed out by the interrogator. After pointing out any
inconsistencies, the interrogator immediately proceeded to the next specific question (see
Figure 3). In the late evidence disclosure condition, the interrogator first asked
participants the free recall question, followed by the specific questions from Table 3.
Then, the interrogator presented all of the evidence at once in a narrative format and
asked participants an open follow-up question (“Can you explain this?”), giving
participants the chance to respond to the evidence. In the early evidence disclosure
condition, the interrogator presented all of the evidence (in narrative format) to
participants before asking any questions. Then, the interrogator asked the aforementioned
free recall question and the specific questions displayed Table 3.
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Figure 3. The SUE-C Questioning Process

Confession Elicitation. Once questioning concluded, the interrogator exited the
room for three minutes to “review his notes” (in line with Tekin et al., 2015; 2016). Upon
reentry, the interrogator asked an open-ended question about whether anything else
happened that he should know about that had occurred after the phone was on the table.
Next, the interrogator told participants that he reviewed the protocol that the Department
of Educational Assessment had sent along with the test and, according to the protocol, he
needed to explicitly ask participants whether or not they had cheated on the test. He then
presented participants with an official form on which the following statement was
written: “Participant used additional resources to provide fraudulent responses.”
As he presented the form, the interrogator indicated that if participants signed the
form, they could “wrap this up.” However, if they refused to sign the form, the
interrogator indicated that the protocol stated that an affiliate from the Department of
Educational Assessment would have to “continue looking into [the] matter more indepth.” The interrogator concluded by stating, “So, if you cheated, I would like you to
admit to it and sign this form.” If participants refused to sign the form during this first
prompt, the interrogator reiterated the outcomes of signing/not signing the form and again
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asked for a written confession. The confession elicitation ended if participants refused to
sign on the second prompt. The interrogator ended the interrogation by stating that he did
not think participants would be in any trouble (to minimize participant distress) and left.
Participant Debriefing. As soon as the interrogator exited the testing room, the
experimenter entered and commenced debriefing. First, the experimenter asked
participants what they thought the study was about (i.e., a manipulation check to assess
the paradigm’s believability), and whether the experimental team was trying to trick or
deceive them in anyway. Participants then completed the post-study questionnaire
(described below).14 After they completed the questionnaire, the experimenter told
participants what the true nature of the study was and informed participants that the
confederate and the interrogator were actually part of the research team. The
experimenter also repeatedly assured participants that they were not in any trouble
whatsoever, as there was no real government-issued test or monetary fine.
The experimenter then told participants that the entire portion of the study that
occurred in the testing room had been covertly video-recorded. At this point, the
experimenter presented participants with the final consent form and the video consent
form. The final consent form gave participants the option to allow me to use their data or
to completely withdraw their consent for their data. Regarding the video consent form,
participants had the option to: (1) allow me to use their video footage for the present
study, as well as potential future studies; (2) allow me to use their video footage for the

14

Although some of the post-interrogation questions may have suggested to participants that the accusation
and interrogation were part of the study, withholding the official debriefing until after participants
responded to these questions should have minimized their knowledge about the true intent of the research
while they completed the questionnaire.
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present study only; or (3) deny permission to use their video footage for research and
have it deleted. The experimenter immediately deleted the videos for participants who
responded with the latter option.
Lastly, the experimenter emphasized to participants the importance of maintaining
psychological realism for future participants by not spreading word about the true nature
of the study. Participants then signed a confidentiality agreement indicating that they
would not discuss study details with potential participants and that they would tell
potential participants who asked about to the study that they just had to answer questions
and fill out some paperwork. Finally, participants were compensated their full payment
($42).
Post-Debriefing Questionnaire
The post-study questionnaire’s function was to garner insight into participants’
interrogation experiences and to assess Houston et al.’s (2014) proposed underlying
psychological predictors of confessions. First, participants responded to questions
regarding their perceptions of how much evidence the interrogator had supporting the
cheating accusation both for when the interrogator first accused them of cheating and
when the interrogator had finished questioning them (1 = the interrogator knew nothing
about what happened during the testing session and 7 = the interrogator knew about
everything that happened during the testing session). Participants next responded to
questions about the extent to which they perceived the evidence against them to be strong
both at the start of the interrogation and by the end of the interrogation (1 = not strong at
all and 7 = extremely strong). Participants also indicated the extent to which they aimed
to implement each of the following strategies during the interrogation (1 = not at all and
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7 = extremely): to be withholding (e.g., not give information); to be in denial (e.g., reject
all allegations made); and to be forthcoming (e.g., voluntarily give information).
Regarding Houston et al.’s (2014) proposed psychological predictors of
confessions, participants responded on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all and
7 = extremely) to items addressing: how much pressure they felt to tell the interrogator
that they cheated; how anxious they were at the start of the interrogation; how guilty they
felt about their behavior during the testing session; how severe they thought the
consequences would be if they did tell the interrogator what happened and if they did not
tell the interrogator what happened; and whether they felt that the interrogator was
pushing them to confess. The post-study questionnaire ended with demographic questions
as well as questions regarding criminal justice system experiences (e.g., prior arrests,
prior interrogation experiences).
Procedure
Participants, along with the confederate, met the experimenter in the psychology
building foyer before being led to the initial lab station. Once there, the experimenter
consented participants (and the confederate), and had them complete some filler tasks
(i.e., personality questionnaires). After moving to the testing room, the cheating and
interrogation paradigm outlined above commenced. Following the interrogation’s
conclusion, the experimenter extensively debriefed participants, and administered postdebriefing questionnaires and compensated participants, thus ending the study.
Pilot Testing
Before running actual community-member participants, the entire experimental
procedure as delineated above was tested and refined using a student participant sample.
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The only procedural deviation was that of participant payment and incentive: Instead of
$30, the student study was advertised to compensate one research credit, and instead of a
chance to win an extra $10, student participants had the chance to win an extra research
credit (which all participants ultimately received). The primary goals of this pilot were to:
(1) determine whether the 15-minute interaction time between the participant and the
confederate was too long or too short; (2) allow interrogators to practice the questioning
protocol; (3) test out different prompts confederates could use to get participants to cheat
/ write out the grocery list; and (4) note and fix any unexpected problems that arose with
the protocol and script. I pilot tested the procedure with 28 student participants. During
pilot testing, I made minor refinements to the procedures and scripts. These refinements
primarily involved improving the clarity of instructions throughout the experiment and
interrogator statements during the interrogation.
Coding for Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies
If participants granted consent to use their videos for the present study, I sent the
audio recordings of their interrogations to a third-party company for transcription.
Transcriptions included participants’ interrogation questioning session as well as the
confession elicitation that followed. Culpability and evidence disclosure conditions were
not listed on the transcriptions. Coders were, however, able to identify the evidence
disclosure technique used based on the questioning format. Additionally, coders may
have been able to infer participant guilt depending on the types of responses participants
made (e.g., discussion of a grocery list was almost always brought up by innocent
participants).
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To examine the extent to which participants’ statements did not match the
evidence against them, two independent coders, who were blind to the study hypotheses,
reviewed participant final statements made in response to the interrogator’s specific
questions. In the SUE-C and SUE-C/E conditions specifically, participants may have
provided multiple responses to the specific questions (e.g., a response to the open
invitation, a response to the interrogator’s request for an explanation). In such instances,
the coders rated all of participants’ responses but for purposes of analyses, only
participants’ final response to each specific question was considered.
The coders evaluated “the extent to which participants’ response to a specific
question [was] consistent with the piece of evidence corresponding to that question.”
Participant responses received one of three possible scores: (1) consistent (the
participant’s response to the specific question was fully consistent with the evidence
related to the specific question); (2) not fully consistent (the participant’s response to the
specific question may have been consistent with the evidence related to the specific
question, meaning that there was a chance that the participant’s response was not
consistent with the evidence [e.g., the response was vague; the participant was hedging
the specific question]); or (3) inconsistent (the participant’s response to the specific
question was not consistent with the evidence related to the specific question, meaning
that the participant did not acknowledge the evidence at all, denied the evidence, or made
an “I don’t know” remark).
The two coders reviewed the same 45 (23.6%) transcripts so that I could assess
interrater reliability. I then divided the remaining transcripts between the two coders for
scoring. Overall, interrater reliability, as assessed by the Cohen kappa statistic, was either
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“moderate” or “almost perfect” (McHugh, 2012).15 Table 4 presents kappa values related
to each of the specific questions.
Table 4. Kappa Scores for Coding Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies
Item

n

Kappa

95% CI

Specific Question #1
44
1.00
*
Specific Question #2
45
0.91
[0.78, 1.03]
Specific Question #3
45
0.69
[0.51, 0.87]
Specific Question #4
40
0.71
[0.53, 0.90]
Note. The interrogator may not have asked all specific questions (i.e., this happened in
instances in which an evidence piece did not occur, the interrogator forgot to ask a
question, or the participant did not provide a substantial response that was codable).
Hence, the sample sizes presented here differ. CI = confidence interval. *No CI was
calculated since there was perfect overlap between scores.
Results
Of the 201 participants who completed the study, I excluded 52 from all
subsequent analyses. The 52 excluded participants represent participants who had been
assigned to the guilty condition but had not cheated. These non-cheaters were therefore
not guilty, but instead had self-selected to be innocent. However, I did not collapse these
non-cheaters into the innocent condition for three reasons: (1) non-cheaters experienced a
completely different situation than did innocent participants (e.g., non-cheaters had the
chance to cheat and watched the confederate cheat, whereas innocent participants did not
have the chance to cheat and dealt with a grocery list); (2) adding the non-cheaters to the
innocent condition would have resulted in highly unbalanced guilty and innocent
subsample sizes; and (3) adding non-cheaters as a third level to the culpability

15

Interpretations for kappa statistics was derived from McHugh’s (2012) interpretations of Cohen’s kappa:
0–.20 (none); .21–.39 (minimal); .40–.59 (weak); .60–.79 (moderate); .80–.90 (strong); and above .90
(almost perfect).
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independent variable would have changed the controlled nature of the experiment by
introducing a quasi-experimental component.
Because I excluded non-cheaters, the overall sample size was reduced to 149
participants (and 140 participants for analyses dependent on transcripts of the recorded
interrogations). In terms of assessing participants’ statement-evidence inconsistencies
using a 2 (culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure) ANOVA, a post-hoc power analysis in
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) revealed that the sample size rendered enough power (.80) to
detect a small effect size (Cohen's ƒ2 = 0.27).
Confession Data
Less than one-third of participants signed the confession form: Of 149
participants, 28.2% signed the written confession. Table 5 displays the number of
participants who confessed in each of the experimental cells. Guilty participants
constituted the majority of confessors, with just over half (52.9%) of guilty participants
confessing. Very few of the confessions elicited were false confessions, as a mere 6.3%
of innocent participants confessed.
Table 5. Number of Participants Who Confessed by Culpability and Evidence Disclosure
Condition
Culpability
Condition

Evidence Disclosure Condition
Early

Late

SUE-C

SUE-C/E

Total

Guilty

50.0%
(9/18)

47.6%
(10/21)

57.1%
(8/14)

58.8%
(10/17)

52.9%
(37/70)

Innocent

6.3%
(1/16)

14.3%
(2/14)

3.4%
(1/29)

5.0%
(1/20)

6.3%
(5/79)

Total

29.4%
34.3%
20.9%
29.7%
28.2%
(10/34)
(12/35)
(9/43)
(11/37)
(42/149)
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent the number of participants who confessed out of
the total number of participants in each experimental cell.
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To examine whether there was an effect of culpability and evidence disclosure
conditions on confession rates, I carried out a hierarchical logistic regression, with
culpability and evidence disclosure entered in the first step and the interaction between
these two terms entered in the second step. The overall model was significant at the first
step, χ2(4) = 43.30, p < .001, R2Nagelkerke = .36. Table 6 displays all regression results. Only
culpability condition emerged as a significant predictor of confession. Specifically, the
odds that a guilty participant confessed were 16.64 times greater than the odds that an
innocent participant confessed. The odds of confession remained stable across the
evidence disclosure conditions (p = .98). The second step of the regression, which
included the interaction term, also emerged as non-significant, χ2(4) = 2.35, p = .50,
R2Nagelkerke = .38.
Table 6. Results for Logistic Regression Analysis Examining the Impact of Culpability
and Evidence Disclosure on Confessions
Predictor

B (SE)

Wald χ2

p

OR

95% CI

Step 1
Guilty vs. Innocent
2.81 (.53)
28.27
< .001
16.64
[5.90, 46.90]
Evidence Disclosure
-0.17
.98
--Late vs. Early
.10 (.59)
0.03
.87
1.11
[0.35, 3.53]
SUE-C vs. Early
.05 (.62)
0.01
.93
1.05
[0.31, 3.57]
SUE-C/E vs. Early
.23 (.61)
0.15
.70
1.26
[0.38, 4.16]
Late vs. SUE-C
-.04 (.60)
0.004
.95
0.96
[0.30, 3.15]
SUE-C/E vs. SUE-C .18 (.62)
0.09
.77
1.20
[0.36, 4.00]
SUE-C/E vs. Late
.22 (.59)
0.14
.71
1.25
[0.39, 3.94]
Step 2
Culpability * Evidence
-2.47
.48
--Note. The second evidence disclosure condition listed in each comparison served as the
reference category for the regression analysis. The model was run three times, with a
different reference category each time, in order to make all comparisons across the
evidence disclosure conditions.
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Psychological Predictors of Confessions
In line with Houston et al.’s (2014) postulation, I examined whether five different
psychological factors (affect, consequences, evidence, guilt, and pressure) predicted
confessions. To address this question, I conducted a logistic regression with confession as
the outcome variable and the following seven variables as predictors: (1) how guilty
participants felt about their behavior during the test; (2) how much evidence participants
thought the interrogator had when they were first accused of cheating; (3) how much
pressure participants felt to tell the interrogator that they cheated; (4) extent to which
participants felt like the interrogator was pushing them to confess; (5) how anxious
participants were when the interrogation began; and (6) how severe participants thought
the consequences were if they (a) did and (b) did not tell the interrogator what happened.
Table 7 displays means and standard deviations for these seven variables. Note that the
sample size for this analysis was 145, as some participant responses for the predictor
variables were missing.
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Table 7. Means and Standard Deviations for Potential Variables Representing
Psychological Predictors of Confessions
All
Confessions

Item

True
Confessions

Anxiety: How anxious were you when the interrogation
3.43 (2.09)
3.64 (2.21)
began?
Consequences (telling the researcher): How severe
did you think the consequences would be if you did tell
2.92 (2.14)
3.36 (2.14)
the interrogator what happened?
Consequences (not telling the researcher): How
severe did you think the consequences would be if you
3.75 (2.32)
4.09 (2.17)
did not tell the interrogator what happened?
Evidence: How much information do you think the
interrogator had supporting the cheating accusation
4.73 (2.10)
4.84 (2.05)
when you were first accused of cheating?
Guilt: When you were being questioned, how guilty did
2.58 (2.04)
3.38 (2.36)
you feel about your behavior during the testing session?
Pressure: How much pressure did you feel to tell the
2.73 (2.14)
3.07 (2.21)
interrogator that you cheated?
Pushy interrogator: I felt like the interrogator was
4.72 (2.34)
4.59 (2.44)
pushing me to confess.
Note. Due to missing data, N = 145 for the variables listed in this table. Descriptives in
the True Confession column are based on a sample of 69 true confessors. All items were
measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely).
The overall model was significant, χ2(7) = 46.59, p < .001, R2Nagelkerke = .40 (Table
8 displays all regression findings). Two variables significantly predicted confession.
Specifically, every one-unit increase of feelings of guilt resulted in odds of confession
1.71 times greater. A one-unit increase in participants’ perception that the interrogator
was pushing them to confess, however, resulted in odds of confession only 0.74 as large.
All other predictors were non-significant.
To determine whether these same confession predictors emerged for true
confessions specifically, I ran a second logistic regression using only the sample of guilty
participants (n = 69; see Table 7 for descriptives); I did not run this analysis for innocent
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participants because the sample of false confessions was too small (n = 5). Again, the
overall model was significant, χ2(7) = 19.73, p = .006, R2Nagelkerke = .33 (Table 8 displays
regression findings). Only feelings of guilt emerged as a predictor of true confessions.
Specifically, every one-unit increase in guilty feelings resulted in odds of confession 1.64
times greater. No other variable significantly predicted true confessions, although
perceptions that the interrogator was pushing for a confession was still trending towards
significance (p = .08) and resulted in an odds ratio similar to the interrogator pushiness
odds ratio observed in the overall confession model.
Table 8. Results for Logistic Regression Analysis Examining Five Psychological Factors
(Affect, Consequences, Evidence, Guilt, and Pressure) on Confessions
Predictor
All confessions model
Anxiety
Consequences (telling
the researcher)
Consequences (not
telling the researcher)
Evidence
Guilt
Pressure
Pushy interrogator
True confessions model
Anxiety
Consequences (telling
the researcher)
Consequences (not
telling the researcher)
Evidence
Guilt
Pressure
Pushy interrogator

B (SE)

Wald χ2

p

OR

95% CI

-.18 (.15)
.19 (.12)

1.43
2.44

.23
.12

0.84
1.21

[0.62, 1.12]
[0.95, 1.52]

-.03(.12)

0.05

.82

0.97

[0.76, 1.24]

-.04 (.12)
.54 (.15)
.15 (.12)
-.30 (.10)

0.12
13.38
1.71
8.33

.73
< .001
.19
.004

0.96
1.71
1.17
0.74

[0.76, 1.21]
[1.28, 2.28]
[0.93, 1.47]
[0.61, 0.91]

-.17 (.19)
.16 (.16)

0.80
1.02

.37
.31

0.84
1.18

[0.58, 1.23]
[0.86, 1.62]

-.002 (.17)

< 0.001

.99

1.00

[0.71, 1.40]

-.06 (.15)
.50 (.21)
-.07 (.19)
-.24 (.14)

0.13
5.56
0.14
3.09

.72
.02
.70
.08

0.95
1.64
0.93
0.79

[0.70, 1.28]
[1.09, 2.49]
[0.65, 1.34]
[0.60, 1.03]

Note. The outcome confession variable was coded as such: 0 = no confession; 1 =
confession.
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Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies
Table 9 displays the number of participants who made fully consistent
(participant’s response fully consistent with the evidence), not fully consistent
(participant’s response may be consistent with the evidence), and inconsistent
(participant’s response not consistent with the evidence) statements in response to the
evidence-specific questions. Overall, the number of participants who made a not fully
consistent statement was low: A mere 5.0% of participants made a not fully consistent
statement in response to Specific Question #1, 6.8% in response to Specific Question #2,
8.2% in response to Specific Question #3, and 9.8% in response to Specific Question #4.
Considering these low percentages, as well as the definition of a not fully consistent
statement, I chose to collapse not fully consistent statements into inconsistent statements
for the purposes of the present analyses.
Table 9. Number of Participants Who Made Consistent, Not Fully Consistent, and
Inconsistent Statements, By Culpability Condition and Evidence Disclosure Condition
Specific
Question

Culpability
Condition

Evidence Disclosure
Condition

Question #1

Guilty

Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E

Innocent

Total

Question #2

Guilty
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Level of Statement-Evidence Consistency
Not Fully
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
8
1
8
1
1
16
4
0
9
10
1
6
23
3
39
12
0
3
5
1
8
14
1
12
11
2
5
42
4
28
20
1
11
6
2
24
18
1
21
21
3
11
65
7
67
8
1
8
8
2
7
4
0
10
10
2
4

Specific
Question

Culpability
Condition
Innocent

Total

Question #3

Guilty

Innocent

Total

Question #4

Guilty

Innocent

Total

Evidence Disclosure
Condition
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
Total

Level of Statement-Evidence Consistency
Not Fully
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
30
5
29
5
1
8
10
0
3
17
0
8
14
3
0
46
4
19
13
2
16
18
2
10
21
0
18
24
5
4
76
9
48
8
1
7
7
1
9
8
0
6
11
1
4
34
3
26
5
3
7
4
1
9
13
3
9
15
1
1
37
8
26
13
4
14
11
2
18
21
3
15
26
2
5
71
11
52
10
1
6
6
2
8
6
1
7
6
5
5
28
9
26
8
1
6
7
2
3
18
0
5
8
0
2
41
3
16
18
2
12
13
4
11
24
1
12
14
5
7
69
12
42

Creation of Inconsistency Variables
I analyzed statement-evidence inconsistencies using two different inconsistency
scores: raw inconsistency scores and mean composite inconsistency scores. The raw
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inconsistency score represented the total number of evidence pieces that the participant’s
statement was inconsistent with. As there were four pieces of evidence (with one specific
question asked per evidence piece), the maximum score was 4, with higher scores
indicating more statement-evidence inconsistencies. However, as previously mentioned,
not all 140 participants responded to all four specific questions (i.e., some responded to
less than four specific questions; n = 23). Thus, it was not appropriate to use a raw
inconsistency score for all participants, as has been done in past SUE research (e.g.,
Tekin et al., 2016).
To be able to compare statement-evidence inconsistencies across all participants
despite the number of questions they responded to, I calculated a mean composite
inconsistency score for each participant. This composite score represented the proportion
of inconsistent statements across each of the statements elicited from the participant in
response to the specific questions that they were asked (i.e., the number of specific
questions asked was the denominator). Inconsistency composite scores therefore ranged
from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating a higher rate of statement-evidence
inconsistencies. Below, I present the results of the analyses for the raw inconsistency
score, followed by the results of the analyses for the composite inconsistency score.
Analysis with the Raw Statement-Evidence Inconsistency Score
To determine whether there was an effect of culpability condition and evidence
disclosure condition on raw statement-evidence inconsistency scores, I ran a 2
(culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure) between-subjects ANOVA. Figures 4a through 4c
present mean raw inconsistency scores across conditions. A main effect for evidence
disclosure condition emerged, F(3, 109) = 3.33, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.08, 90% CI [0.01, 0.16].
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LSD post-hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the Late condition made more
statement-evidence inconsistencies compared to participants in the SUE-C/E condition (p
= .003). Similarly, participants in the Early condition made more statement-evidence
inconsistencies than did participants in the SUE-C/E condition (p = .05). No other
comparisons were significant (all ps > .22). A main effect of culpability also emerged,
F(1, 109) = 3.91, p = .05, ηp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.01, 0.17], whereby guilty participants
made more statement-evidence inconsistencies than did innocent participants.
There was no significant interaction between culpability and evidence disclosure
technique, F(3, 109) = 1.20, p = .31, ηp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08]. However, because I
hypothesized a priori that the differences in statement-evidence inconsistencies between
guilty and innocent participants would be greater in the three SUE conditions than in the
early disclosure condition, I carried out four independent-samples t-tests (Bonferroni
correction: critical p = .013) to address this hypothesis. The results revealed that the
significance-level associated with the difference in the raw number of statement-evidence
inconsistencies between guilty and innocent participants in the SUE-C condition nearly
exceeded the critical cut-off, t(33) = 2.46, p = .02, d = 0.89, 95% CI [0.52, 1.26].
Specifically, there was a trend such that guilty participants questioned with SUE-C made
more evidence-inconsistent statements than did innocent participants in the same
interrogation condition. Statement-evidence inconsistency comparisons between guilty
and innocent participants in the other three evidence disclosure conditions were nonsignificant: Early, t(28) = .38, p = .71, d = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.64]; Late, t(25) = .96, p
= .35, d = 0.39, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.83]; and SUE-C/E, t(21.82) = 1.43, p = .17, d = 0.54,
95% CI [0.08, 1.00]. However, it is notable that a medium effect size emerged in the
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SUE-C/E condition, especially compared to the small effect size rendered in the Early
condition. Also notable is that when descriptively reviewing the results, I found that
statement-evidence inconsistency means were higher for guilty than innocent participants
in all three SUE conditions but not in the Early disclosure condition (statement-evidence
inconsistencies were descriptively higher for innocent than guilty participants in the Early
condition).
Figure 4. Mean Raw Inconsistency Scores By (a) Culpability Condition, (b) Evidence
Disclosure Condition, (c) Culpability by Evidence Disclosure
(a) Raw Inconsistency Scores: Culpability
4.0
Raw inconsistency score

3.5
p = .05

3.0
2.5

2.05

2.0

1.59

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Guilty

Culpability Condition
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Innocent

(b) Raw Inconsistency Scores: Evidence Disclosure
4.0

p = .05

Raw inconsistency score

3.5

p = .003

3.0
2.5

2.33
1.97
1.69

2.0

1.28

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Early

Late

SUE-C

SUE-C/E

Evidence Disclosure Condition

(c) Raw Inconsistency Scores: Culpability * Evidence Disclosure
4.0
d = 0.39

Raw inconsistency score

3.5
3.0
2.5

d = 0.14

1.88

2.07

Guilty

d = 0.89

2.53

2.30

2.08

Innocent
d = 0.54

1.53

2.0

1.32

1.5

0.90

1.0
0.5
0.0
Early

Late

SUE-C

SUE-C/E

Evidence Disclosure Condition

Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Effect sizes are displayed in Figure 4c.
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Analysis with the Mean Composite Statement-Evidence Inconsistency Score
I conducted a 2 (culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure) between-subjects ANOVA
to assess the effect of my independent variables on the mean composite inconsistency
score. Figures 5a through 5c display composite scores. The pattern of results was similar
to the results derived from the raw inconsistency score analysis. Specifically, a main
effect emerged for culpability, F(1, 132) = 7.25, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.05, 90% CI [0.01, 0.12],
as well as for evidence disclosure, F(3, 132) = 3.74, p = .01, ηp2 = 0.08, 90% CI [0.01,
0.14]. Concerning evidence disclosure techniques, just as with raw scores, LSD post-hoc
comparisons revealed that composite inconsistency scores were significantly higher in the
Late condition (p = .001) and the Early condition (p = .05), as compared to the SUE-C/E
condition; no other comparisons were significant (all ps > .06). As with raw scores, guilty
participants’ composite inconsistency scores were significantly higher than those for
innocent participants.
Additionally, there was no significant interaction between culpability and
evidence disclosure on composite inconsistency scores, F(3, 132) = 0.68, p = .57, ηp2 =
0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04]. As with the raw scores, I examined the extent to which guilty
and innocent participants differed in each evidence disclosure condition in terms of their
mean composite inconsistency scores in order to address my a priori hypothesis.
Independent-samples t-tests (Bonferroni correction: critical p = .013) indicated a trend
towards significance in the SUE-C/E condition, as guilty participants demonstrated a
higher mean composite inconsistency score than did innocent participants, t(27.57) =
2.08, p = .047, d = 0.73, 95% CI [0.63, 0.84]. Significant differences did not emerge in
the other three evidence disclosure conditions: Early, t(30) = .13, p = .90, d = 0.05, 95%
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CI [-0.08, 0.17]; Late, t(30) = 1.54, p = .14, d = 0.57, 95% CI [0.46, 0.67]; and SUE-C,
t(39) = 1.82, p = .08, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.52, 0.71]. Notable, however, are the medium
effect sizes demonstrated in the Late and SUE-C conditions, especially as compared to
the effect size of nearly zero in the Early condition.
Figure 5. Mean Composite Inconsistency Scores By (a) Culpability Condition, (b)
Evidence Disclosure Condition, (c) Culpability by Evidence Disclosure
(a) Mean Composite Inconsistency Scores: Culpability
Mean composite inconsistency score

1.00
p = .01

0.80
0.56
0.60

0.40
0.40
0.20
0.00
Guilty

Innocent
Culpability Condition
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(b) Mean Composite Inconsistency Scores: Evidence Disclosure

Mean composite inconsistency score

1.00

p = .05
p = .001

0.80
0.60

0.62
0.49

0.48
0.33

0.40
0.20
0.00
Early

Late
SUE-C
Evidence Disclosure Condition

SUE-C/E

(c) Mean Composite Inconsistency Scores: Culpability * Evidence Disclosure

Mean composite inconsistency score

1.00

Guilty

d = 0.57
d = 0.61

0.80
0.60

d = 0.05

0.50

0.48

0.69

0.61

Innocent
d = 0.73

0.52

0.46
0.42

0.40
0.22
0.20
0.00
Early

Late
SUE-C
Evidence Disclosure Condition

SUE-C/E

Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Effect sizes are displayed in Figure 5c.
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Participants’ Subjective Ratings
Perceptions of the Evidence
To determine whether participants’ perceptions of the amount of evidence the
interrogator had against them changed from the start to the end of the interrogation, and
whether this change varied by culpability and evidence disclosure conditions, I carried
out a 2 (interrogation start, interrogation end) x 2 (culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure)
mixed-design ANOVA, with interrogation timing varying within-subjects (see Table 10
for descriptives; note that both of these ratings were provided on the debriefing
questionnaire, they were not provided at the start and end of the interrogation
respectively). The results revealed a main effect for interrogation timing, GreenhouseGeisser F(1, 138) = 4.39, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.001, 0.09]. Not surprisingly,
participants believed that the interrogator had more incriminating evidence by the time
the interrogation ended compared to when the interrogation began. There was no main
effect of culpability, F(1, 138) = 0.93, p = .34, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.05], nor of
evidence disclosure condition, F(3, 138) = 1.71, p = .17, ηp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08].
Additionally, there was no significant interaction between interrogation timing and
culpability condition, Greenhouse-Geisser F(1, 138) = 0.78, p = .38, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI
[0.00, 0.04], between interrogation timing and evidence disclosure condition,
Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 138) = 0.59, p = .62, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], between
culpability and evidence disclosure conditions, F(3, 138) = 1.36, p = .26, ηp2 = 0.03, 90%
CI [0.00, 0.07], nor between all three variables, Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 138) = 0.02, p =
.997, ηp2 < 0.01.
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I also examined whether participants’ perceptions of the strength of the evidence
against them changed from the start to the end of the interrogation, and whether this
varied by culpability and evidence disclosure conditions (see Table 10 for descriptives;
note that both of these ratings were provided on the debriefing questionnaire, they were
not provided at the start and end of the interrogation respectively). A 2 (interrogation
start, interrogation end) x 2 (culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure) mixed-design
ANOVA, with interrogation timing serving as the within-subjects variable, showed that
guilty participants perceived the evidence against them to be stronger than did innocent
participants, F(1, 138) = 17.50, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.11, 90% CI [0.04, 0.20]. Perceptions of
evidence strength did not significantly vary from the start to end of the interrogation,
Greenhouse-Geisser F(1, 138) < 0.01, p = .999, ηp2 < 0.01, nor by evidence disclosure
condition, F(3, 138) = 0.89, p = .45, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.05]. There was no
significant interaction between interrogation timing and culpability condition,
Greenhouse-Geisser F(1, 138) = 0.73, p = .39, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], between
interrogation timing and evidence disclosure condition, Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 138) =
0.99, p = .40, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.06], between culpability and evidence
disclosure conditions, F(3, 138) = 1.76, p = .16, ηp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08], nor
between all three variables, Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 138) = 0.22, p = .89, ηp2 = 0.01,
90% CI [0.00, 0.01].

79

Table 10. Means and Standard Deviations for Participants’ Perceptions of the Amount
and Strength of Incriminating Evidence at the Start and End of the Interrogation
Variable

Interrogation Time
Evidence Disclosure
Condition
Start
End
Amount of
Early
4.72 (2.24)
5.61 (1.46)
evidence
Late
5.05 (2.09)
5.24 (2.19)
SUE-C
4.00 (2.00)
4.36 (1.95)
SUE-C/E
5.44 (1.71)
6.13 (1.86)
Total
4.84 (2.05)
5.36 (1.95)
Innocent
Early
5.06 (1.65)
5.56 (1.63)
Late
4.54 (2.11)
4.46 (2.33)
SUE-C
4.54 (2.13)
4.68 (2.34)
SUE-C/E
4.50 (2.61)
4.80 (2.62)
Total
4.84 (2.05)
4.86 (2.28)
Total
Early
4.88 (1.97)
5.59 (1.52)
Late
4.85 (2.08)
4.94 (2.24)
SUE-C
4.36 (2.08)
4.57 (2.20)
SUE-C/E
4.92 (2.27)
5.39 (2.38)
Total
4.73 (2.10)
5.10 (2.14)
Strength of
Guilty
Early
5.11 (1.78)
5.28 (1.84)
evidence
Late
4.19 (2.23)
4.38 (2.36)
SUE-C
3.50 (2.07)
3.36 (1.87)
SUE-C/E
4.13 (2.73)
4.37 (2.53)
Total
4.28 (2.24)
4.41 (2.23)
Innocent
Early
2.56 (2.31)
2.25 (1.77)
Late
3.00 (2.38)
3.00 (2.45)
SUE-C
3.00 (2.13)
2.50 (1.90)
SUE-C/E
3.00 (2.34)
3.35 (2.46)
Total
2.91 (2.23)
2.75 (2.13)
Total
Early
3.91 (2.43)
3.85 (2.35)
Late
3.74 (2.29)
3.85 (2.45)
SUE-C
3.17 (2.09)
2.79 (1.91)
SUE-C/E
3.50 (2.55)
3.81 (2.51)
Total
3.55 (2.33)
3.53 (2.32)
Note. N = 146 for amount of evidence and strength of evidence analyses. Standard
deviations are displayed in parentheses. Amount of evidence (1 = the interrogator knew
nothing about what happened during the testing session and 7 = the interrogator knew
about everything that happened during the testing session) and strength of evidence (1 =
not strong at all and 7 = extremely strong) were measured on seven-point Likert-type
scales.
Culpability
Condition
Guilty
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Perceptions of Strategies
I ran three 2 (culpability) x 4 (evidence disclosure) between-subjects ANOVAs
(critical p = .017)16 to assess three variables concerning participants’ perceptions of the
extent to which they aimed to be: (1) withholding; (2) in denial; and (3) forthcoming.
Table 11 displays means and standard deviations for these three outcome variables. In
terms of being withholding, the only significant finding that emerged was for the main
effect for culpability, F(1, 138) = 10.76, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.07, 90% CI [0.02, 0.15]; there
was no significant main effect of evidence disclosure condition, F(3, 138) = 0.54, p = .66,
ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], nor a significant interaction, F(3, 138) = 0.99, p = .40,
ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.06]. Similarly, the only significant finding for the strategy of
being in denial was the main effect for culpability, F(1, 138) = 7.42, p = .007, ηp2 = 0.05,
90% CI [0.01, 0.12]; there was no significant main effect of evidence disclosure
condition, F(3, 138) = 0.28, p = .84, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.02], nor a significant
interaction, F(3, 138) = 1.04, p = .38, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.06]. Lastly, as with the
other outcomes, the only main effect to emerge for the forthcomingness variable was that
for culpability, F(1, 138) = 17.21, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.11, 90% CI [0.04, 0.20]. There was
neither a main effect for evidence disclosure condition, F(3, 138) = 0.47, p = .70, ηp2 =
0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.03], nor a significant interaction, F(3, 138) = 0.12, p = .95, ηp2 <
0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.001]. Overall, the results demonstrated that guilty participants’
ratings for aiming to be withholding and in denial were higher than innocent participants’

16

I did not use a MANOVA to examine these three variables, as the strategy of being forthcoming is
conceptually different than those strategies of being withholding and being in denial.
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ratings, while innocent participants reported higher forthcomingness scores than did
guilty participants.
Table 11. Means and Standard Deviations for Participants’ Ratings of the Extent to
Which They Aimed to Be Withholding, In Denial, and Forthcoming
Culpability Condition
Evidence Disclosure
Condition
Guilty
Innocent
Total
Withholding
Early
2.17 (1.79)
1.19 (0.54)
1.71 (1.43)
Late
2.14 (1.85)
1.54 (0.78)
1.91 (1.55)
SUE-C
2.29 (1.77)
1.96 (1.53)
2.07 (1.60)
SUE-C/E
2.69 (2.18)
1.20 (0.70)
1.86 (1.69)
Total
2.30 (1.87)
1.53 (1.11)
1.90 (1.56)
In Denial
Early
3.17 (2.26)
3.63 (2.90)
3.28 (2.55)
Late
2.86 (2.29)
4.31 (2.78)
3.41 (2.55)
SUE-C
1.93 (1.33)
4.18 (2.75)
3.43 (2.58)
SUE-C/E
3.00 (2.37)
3.50 (2.84)
3.28 (2.61)
Total
2.78 (2.14)
3.91 (2.77)
3.38 (2.55)
Forthcoming
Early
5.61 (1.58)
6.63 (1.26)
6.09 (1.51)
Late
5.05 (2.36)
6.54 (0.97)
5.62 (2.06)
SUE-C
5.14 (1.75)
6.29 (1.21)
5.90 (1.50)
SUE-C/E
5.12 (2.13)
6.25 (1.77)
5.75 (1.99)
Total
5.23 (1.97)
6.39 (1.34)
5.84 (1.76)
Note. N = 146 for analyses of participants’ reports of the extent to which they aimed to be
withholding, in denial, and forthcoming. Standard deviations are presented in
parentheses. Each of the three outcomes were measured on a seven-point Likert-type
scale (1 = not at all and 7 = extremely).
Variable

Discussion
Confession Findings
The overall confession rate in the present study was low (28.2%). This low
confession rate does not come as a surprise, as the majority of the evidence disclosure
conditions were characterized by SUE and the primary purpose of the SUE technique is
not to elicit confessions, but rather to elicit information and diagnostic cues to deception
(e.g., Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). Indeed, Jordan et al. (2012) elicited very few
confessions overall (11.1%). Yet, it is important to note that Jordan et al. (2012)
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employed a mock crime paradigm to test SUE, whereas the present study employed a
psychologically realistic paradigm. The present participants believed that if they
confessed, they faced the possibility of a $50–500 fine; thus, even with such a seemingly
severe consequence in place, it is notable that the present study’s confession rate was at
nearly 30%. Contrarily, Sellers and Kebbell (2009) achieved a high overall confession
rate (65.3%), but the researchers had used a mock crime paradigm and their entire sample
was guilty (they did not look at false confession rates). Comparably, the confession rate
for guilty participants in the current study was over 50%.
Examination of potential underlying psychological predictors of confession, as
proposed by Houston et al. (2014), offer some insight on why participants in the present
study confessed. As demonstrated by the present findings, the strongest predictor for
confession was participants’ feeling of guilt: The more guilty participants reportedly felt,
the more likely they were to confess (a finding consistent with Houston et al., who
examined student samples). Notably, perceptions of the evidence did not significantly
predict confessions. One potential reason for evidence perceptions’ lack of predictive
power could be attributed to the perceived strength of the evidence used in the present
paradigm. Indeed, participants’ ratings for evidence strength were low (all means fell
below the mid-point on the scale). It is possible that if the evidence presented to
participants was stronger (e.g., showing participants the confederate’s test with identical
answers to participants’ tests), then there may have been an increase in overall confession
rate. Indeed, Sellers and Kebbell (2009) found that evidence strength significantly
predicted confessions. Future studies should therefore consider examining the impact of
evidence strength on confession decisions in the context of a psychologically realistic
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paradigm, as this can contribute to a better understanding of how perceptions of the
evidence can impact confession decisions.
Despite the present study’s low confession rate, the pattern of true versus false
confessions specifically was similar to patterns seen in past research. For example, when
no coercive interrogation tactics were used, Russano et al. (2005) achieved a 46% true
confession rate and a 6% false confession rate—rates similar to the 52.9% and 6.3%,
respectively, achieved across all evidence disclosure conditions in the present study.
Furthermore, the present results suggest that strategic evidence disclosure techniques, at
least when used in isolation, do not necessarily decrease the risk of false confessions
beyond the rates found when early disclosure of evidence is used. This finding could be
attributed to the fact that early disclosure of evidence itself did not result in a high
number of false confessions (i.e., there was a floor effect for false confessions).
The lack of false confessions in the early disclosure condition is an important
finding to note, as the interrogation literature has traditionally tied early evidence
disclosure to the risk of false confession (e.g., Leo, 1996). Early evidence disclosure is,
however, often incorporated with other tactics to form interrogation methods that, as a
whole, have been demonstrated to increase the risk of false confession. For example, the
Reid technique promotes the use of early evidence disclosure (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, &
Jayne, 2013), along with other undiagnostic tactics such as false evidence ploys and
implicit promises of leniency. Considering the present findings, however, it seems that
early evidence disclosure alone is not necessarily predictive of false confessions.
Moreover, the majority of findings in the SUE literature attest to SUE’s efficacy
in eliciting reliable, diagnostic cues to deception (e.g., statement-evidence
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inconsistencies; Hartwig et al., 2005; Hartwig et al., 2014). Yet, only two other studies
(Jordan et al., 2012; Sellers & Kebbell, 2009) examined confession rates. These studies
were limited to mock crime paradigms with low confession rates (Jordan et al., 2012) or
true confessions exclusively (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009). The present study addressed this
gap, as the current confession findings can assure law enforcement that the
implementation of the SUE technique, whether it be late disclosure, SUE-C, or SUE-C/E,
does not negatively impact true confession rates, nor does it increase false confession
rates. As such, the present findings can help researchers better promote the SUE
technique to law enforcement. Overall, the existing and current research suggest that the
implementation of SUE (in isolation) does not directly impact confession decisions.
Statement-Evidence Inconsistencies
As expected, guilty participants demonstrated more statement-evidence
inconsistencies than innocent participants (although both culpability groups were
relatively high in terms of statement-evidence inconsistencies). This finding is in line
with the postulation that guilty suspects are less forthcoming than innocent suspects. Past
studies have found that guilty suspects typically engage in denial and avoidant behaviors
to mitigate interrogators’ perceptions of their guilt, whereas innocent suspects aim to tell
the truth (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Granhag & Luke, 2018). My results were consistent
with this: Guilty participants in the present study reported being more withholding and in
denial than did innocent participants, and innocent participants reported being more
forthcoming than did guilty participants. The present findings therefore contribute to the
robust literature indicating that guilty suspects usually engage in counter-interrogation
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strategies characterized by avoidance and innocent suspects are generally more
forthcoming.
Unexpectedly, main effect analyses of evidence disclosure technique on
statement-evidence inconsistencies showed that the three SUE conditions did not result in
significantly more statement-evidence inconsistencies than did the early disclosure
condition. In fact, SUE-C/E demonstrated the fewest statement-evidence inconsistencies
across all of the evidence disclosure conditions, with the comparison to the early and late
disclosure conditions being statistically-significant. This latter finding concerning the
comparison between the SUE-C/E and late disclosure conditions is especially relevant, as
the past studies examining SUE-C/E and SUE-C (Tekin et al., 2015; 2016) did not
compare these disclosure methods to the late disclosure method, which is the original and
most studied of the SUE variations. When revisiting past SUE literature, we typically see
a main effect of evidence disclosure on statement-evidence inconsistencies, by which the
late disclosure condition renders more statement-evidence inconsistencies than does the
early evidence disclosure condition (e.g., Jordan et al., 2012). Thus, in terms of eliciting
statement-evidence inconsistencies, the late disclosure condition appears to excel above
other SUE variations.
However, just because SUE-C/E did not elicit many statement-evidence
inconsistencies overall is no cause for its dismissal as a valid and effective questioning
strategy. One potential reason for the lower number of statement-evidence
inconsistencies seen in SUE-C/E, and especially so for guilty participants, could be due
to the manner in which I coded participants’ statements. Specifically, participants’ final
statement to each specific question was coded for inconsistency in order to enable
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examination of the effect of SUE-C (participants can clarify their initial responses) and
SUE-C/E (participants can clarify their initial responses as well as explain any evidenceinconsistencies) on participants’ overall response to each specific question (i.e., if I coded
only initial responses, the data would not reflect the effect of the core component of SUEC/E, being the explanation, on participants’ statements). I therefore postulate that
participants questioned with SUE-C/E may have shifted their counter-interrogation
strategy within their responses to a single specific question from avoidance to
forthcomingness after being confronted with any inconsistencies. Essentially, participants
used their opportunity for explanation to be forthcoming rather than to try to explain
away any inconsistencies—an opportunity that participants in the SUE-C and late
disclosure conditions did not have.
Furthermore, the differences in timing of evidence disclosure between the SUE-C
and C/E conditions and the late disclosure condition may contribute to the differences in
statement-evidence inconsistencies. The interrogator presented participants with the
evidence incrementally in the SUE-C and C/E conditions, along with corrective feedback
(i.e., pointing out statement-evidence inconsistencies), whereas the interrogator presented
all evidence at once in the late disclosure condition with no corrective feedback. By
presenting the evidence incrementally along with feedback, I postulate that the
interrogator employing SUE-C and SUE-C/E essentially gave participants the chance to
shift their strategy to one of being more forthcoming once they recognized that their
avoidant strategy was not working (i.e., the interrogator was able to keep pointing out the
inconsistencies and participants were therefore able to be more dynamic in their
statement strategies from one specific question to the next). Contrarily, in the late
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disclosure condition, participants presumably maintained their avoidant strategy
throughout the questioning, as they were not aware of any of the evidence that the
interrogator held and did not receive corrective feedback throughout the questioning
session.
When considering the difference in statement-evidence inconsistencies between
evidence disclosure conditions depending on participants’ guilt status, the results did
partially support my hypothesis. Although p-values fell below the Bonferroni-corrected
significance level, I found that the effect sizes representing the difference between guilty
and innocent participants’ statement-evidence inconsistencies ranged from medium to
large in the SUE-C and SUE-C/E conditions, regardless of how I measured statementevidence inconsistencies (raw or mean composite scores). Unexpectedly, the effect size
that emerged in the late disclosure condition ranged from small (raw score) to medium
(mean composite score). Guilty suspects may therefore be more distinguishable from
innocent suspects on the basis of statement-evidence inconsistencies when questioned
with SUE-C or SUE-C/E than with the late disclosure method. Yet, all three SUE
methods appear to be more effective than early disclosure, which resulted in essentially
no difference between guilty and innocent participants’ statement-evidence
inconsistencies (as measured by the composite score) or even more inconsistencies by
innocent than guilty participants (as measured by the raw score).
Although Study 1 findings are interesting, statement-evidence inconsistencies do
not necessarily represent a practical outcome measure for law enforcement officers who
are considering the benefits of employing SUE tactics, as they may not have the
resources to code their interrogations for statement-evidence inconsistencies. As such, I
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pursued Study 2 to determine what implications the differences in participant statements,
which derived from the SUE technique employed, had for observers’ ability to accurately
judge participants’ culpability.
III. STUDY 2
Study 2 examined observers’ ability to accurately determine whether interviewees
questioned with different evidence disclosure techniques were guilty or innocent of
having committed a transgression. Specifically, student participants viewed a random
selection of Study 1 videotaped interrogations that employed one of the four types of
evidence disclosure methods (early disclosure, late disclosure, SUE-C, or SUE-C/E).
Study 2’s research questions and associated hypotheses were as follows:
(1) Can SUE techniques help observers better distinguish between guilty and
innocent suspects? I hypothesized that participants would demonstrate higher
culpability judgment accuracy rates17 when viewing interviewees being
questioned with one of the three SUE methods, compared to being questioned
with the early disclosure method. This prediction fell in line with past research
(e.g., Hartwig et al., 2005).
(2) Can implementing the SUE technique protect the credibility of innocent
suspects who ultimately confess? I hypothesized that participants would be
less likely to misidentify innocent interviewees who were questioned with a
SUE technique as guilty even after they confessed, as compared to those

17

I did not measure participants’ deception detection accuracy per se. Specifically, participants in the
present study did not make decisions about whether interviewees were lying or telling the truth, but rather
about whether interviewees had or had not cheated on the test. I therefore used the term “culpability
judgment” in the present study. I do, however, draw parallels between the present findings and deception
detection findings in the SUE literature, as these concepts are similar.
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questioned with early disclosure. Such a pattern of results would presumably
be due to the greater number of evidence-consistent statements that innocent
suspects offer when questioned with SUE techniques.
Method
Participants
I recruited participants via the psychology department’s participant pool and
awarded participants one research participation credit for partaking in the study. A total
of 342 participants consented to and completed the study. Of participants who consented,
46 participants either did not attempt or failed the sound test18 and were thus excluded
from the sample. An additional 47 participants quit the study prior to viewing the
interrogation videos and one participant quit before viewing the second video; thus, I
excluded these 48 participants.
From the remaining 248 participants, I excluded additional participants based on
the following criteria (exclusions were made in this order): missing one or both of two
attention check questions (“For this question, would you please select the number
seven?” and “For this question, can you select the number that two plus two equals?;” n =
11); missing the interviewee gender attention check question (n = 6); and taking longer
than two standard deviations above the mean study duration to complete the study (i.e.,
longer than 946.17 minutes; n = 5).
Participants responded to two additional attention check questions related to the
content of what interviewees said during the interrogation (“Did the Participant in the

18

The sound test was implemented at the start of the study to ensure that participants could hear and
understand verbal content. The Procedure section includes details concerning the sound test.
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video mention writing anything down while looking at the phone?” and “Did the
Participant in the video explicitly mention that the other participant had a phone during
the testing session?”), with each of these questions being posed twice (once after the
guilty video and once after the innocent video). Each correct response earned one point.
The maximum score participants could therefore receive was four. The proportion of
participants who received each possible score on these manipulation check questions (i.e.,
the total number of correct responses provided by participants) is as follows: score of 0
(4.3%); score of 1 (10.8%); score of 2 (29.0%); score of 3 (36.4%); and score of 4
(19.5%). Thus, a large proportion of participants did not correctly answer all
interrogation content manipulation questions. Rather than take an extremely conservative
route and exclude all participants who did not achieve a perfect score, which would have
resulted in a total sample size of 45 participants, I only excluded participants who missed
more than one interrogation content manipulation check question (n = 102).
One-hundred and twenty-nine participants remained in the sample after I made
the aforementioned exclusions.19 A post-hoc power analysis in G*Power (Faul et al.,
2007) revealed that this sample size rendered enough power (.80) to find a medium effect
(Cohen's ƒ2 = 0.34) using a one-way ANOVA. The majority of participants were female
(85.3%) and Hispanic/Latinx (71.9%), with the remaining participants identifying as
Black (14.8%), White (7.8%), Asian (1.6%), and multiracial/other (3.9%). Participants
were, on average, 23-years-old (SD = 6), with ages ranging from 18 to 54-years-old.

19

One participant did not respond to demographic questions; 128 participants total responded.
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Design
Study 2 was characterized by a 2 (interviewee culpability: guilty, innocent) x 4
(type of evidence disclosure: Early, Late, SUE-C, SUE-C/E) mixed design, with
interviewee culpability varying within-participants and type of evidence disclosure
varying between-participants. Cell sizes for the between-participants variable were as
follows: Early (n = 24); Late (n = 34); SUE-C (n = 36); and SUE-C/E (n = 35).
Materials
Interrogation Videos
The interrogation videos used in the present study were randomly selected from
the sample of videos collected in Study 1. To ensure stimulus sampling, I selected three
videos for each experimental cell; however, regarding the Innocent-Early disclosure cell,
I selected only two videos because many of the videos pertaining to this cell did not have
Study 1 participant consent for use. Thus, the video sample included a total of 23
interrogation videos. I assessed all 23 included videos to ensure that: (1) there was a clean
culpability manipulation (i.e., guilty interviewees had used the phone to cheat and
innocent interviewees had used the phone to write down the grocery list); (2) all four
evidence pieces had occurred (see Table 3 in Study 1); (3) the interrogator had correctly
followed the interrogation script related to the evidence disclosure condition; and (4)
interviewees in the videos did not explicitly admit to copying answers directly off of the
phone.
All videos were characterized by an equal-focused camera view (i.e., participants
viewed the profile of both the interrogator and interviewee). The videos began when the
interrogator introduced the problem (“…after looking into your tests more, I have a
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reasonable suspicion that you and the other participant cheated on the test…”) and ended
after interviewees responded to the interrogator’s final question. Notably, participants did
not view the confession elicitation portion of interviewees’ interrogations. The videos
lasted on average 5.97 minutes (SD = 1.19).
Post-Video Questionnaire
The post-video questionnaire followed each interrogation video that participants
watched. Participants indicated whether they believed that the interviewee in the video
had or had not cheated on the test (dichotomous culpability judgment: the participant
cheated on the test; the participant did not cheat on the test). Then, participants rated:
how confident they were in their judgment of whether or not the participant had cheated
(Likert-type scale; 1 = not at all confident and 10 = extremely confident); how likely it
was that the participant cheated on the test (Likert-type scale; 1 = definitely did not cheat
and 10 = definitely did cheat); and the extent to which they relied on nonverbal (e.g., eye
gaze, body movements), verbal (e.g., participant contradicting self), and paraverbal cues
(e.g., the way the participant spoke words, tone of voice) when making their decision
about whether or not the participant had cheated (Likert-type scale; 1 = not at all and 10
= a lot).
Next, participants read that following the questioning session they just viewed,
the same interviewee had ended up admitting to using a phone to cheat on the test and
signed a document stating this. Participants received this information regardless of
whether the interviewee had actually confessed or not in Study 1.20 After receiving this
20

I tested confession influence in this manner because I had expected that not all types of evidence
disclosure methods would result in confessions, particularly from innocent suspects (this was indeed the
case as seen in Study 1). The described design proactively addressed this potential issue.
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information, participants were again asked whether they believed that the interviewee had
cheated or not on the test, how confident they were in their judgment about whether the
interviewee had cheated, and how likely they thought it was that the interviewee had
cheated. Participants also indicated the level of influence of the interviewee’s admission
on their ultimate decision about the interviewee’s culpability (Likert-type scale; 1 = not
at all influential and 10 = extremely influential). Lastly, participants used a slider to
indicate which of the following they weighted more in their final decision about whether
or not the interviewee was guilty of cheating: (1) the statements that the interviewee
made in the video of their questioning session; or (2) the written admission of cheating
that the interviewee made after the questioning session. Negative values up to –50
indicated more weight placed on the interviewee’s statements, positive values up to +50
indicated more weight placed on the interviewee’s written admission of cheating, and 0
indicated equal weight.
Finally, participants responded to attention check questions. To ensure that
participants had actually viewed the interrogation videos, I asked them: (1) to indicate the
sex of the interviewee; (2) whether the interviewee in the video explicitly stated that they
were writing something down while looking at the phone, and if so, what did they say
that they were writing;21 and (3) whether the interviewee had explicitly mentioned that
the other participant had a phone during the testing session. Participants also responded to
an additional attention check question in this block of questions (e.g., for this question,
would you please select the number seven?).

21

I did not exclude participants based on the free response portion of this attention check question.
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Procedure
The study took place entirely online. After consenting to participation,
participants read that they would be watching videos as part of the study and should
ensure that they were in a private setting without distractions and would be able to hear
audio. I then presented participants with a sound test, which required them to select the
numbers they heard in an audio clip. Participants had to retake this sound test as many
times as it took them to select the correct numbers, thus ensuring that participants would
be able to hear the interrogation videos presented later in the study.
Upon successfully passing the sound test, participants read that the videos they
were about to watch were recorded during a recent study in which the researchers
assessed the types of statements that interviewees made when being accused of cheating
on a test. Participants further read that the true purpose of this recent study was to
understand people's reactions to being interrogated; however, the interviewees were not
aware that this was the true purpose of the study and instead believed the study that they
were a part of was examining the community's level of general knowledge. I then
emphasized to participants that the reactions and statements that they would see in
response to the accusation are real, as the interviewees in the videos believed that they
were in trouble.
Next, participants read more about the assessment that the interviewees had taken
part in (i.e., each assessment session involved two participants answering 20 general
knowledge questions in the same testing room and were told that they needed to work
alone on answering these questions, could not use any additional resources, such as
cellphones, or help each other while working on the questions). Participants then read
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that during the testing session, some participants were given the opportunity to cheat,
while others were not given the opportunity to cheat; thus, some participants did cheat,
and some did not cheat.
At this point, I told participants that they were now about to watch a random
selection of videos that depicted the questioning of interviewees from different testing
sessions, and that all interviewees, both who had or had not cheated, had been accused of
cheating. I emphasized to participants that all pieces of evidence presented to the
interviewees in the videos were true (i.e., the researcher did not make them up), and that
the pieces of evidence did not exclude the possibility that interviewees did not cheat, as
there was a 50% chance that any given interviewee was innocent and a 50% chance that
any given interviewee was guilty.
I presented participants with a total of two videos (one randomly selected guilty
and one randomly selected innocent; order counterbalanced) associated to the evidence
disclosure condition to which they were randomly assigned.22 After watching the first
video, participants completed the post-video questionnaire. Participants then read a
reminder that the pieces of evidence did not exclude the possibility that the interviewee
did not cheat, as there was a 50% chance that any given interviewee was innocent and a
50% chance that any given interviewee was guilty. The second interrogation video
followed this reminder, after which participants completed the post-video questionnaire

22

In deception detection studies, participants typically view more than two interview videos. However,
given the nature of Study 1 from which the videos were drawn, this was not possible. Participants would
have presumably seen a pattern in interviewees’ responses, as all innocent interviewees in the sample used
for Study 2, except one, mentioned the grocery list, whereas none of the guilty participants mentioned a
grocery list.
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for the second interrogation they viewed. Lastly, participants completed a demographic
questionnaire and were debriefed.
Results
Before conducting the main analyses, I assessed whether participant responses
significantly varied depending on the specific video stimuli they viewed. Four one-way
ANOVAs (one for each evidence disclosure condition; Table 12 displays results)
indicated that participants’ pre-confession overall culpability judgment accuracy scores
did not significantly differ across the three separate guilty interrogation videos within
each of the conditions. Pre-confession overall accuracy scores also did not significantly
differ across the individual innocent interrogation videos within each of the evidence
disclosure conditions (see Table 12).
Table 12. One-way ANOVA Results Testing Differences in Pre-Confession Overall
Culpability Judgment Accuracy Scores Across Individual Video Stimuli
Culpability
Guilty Videos

Evidence Disclosure

Results
F(2, 21) = .21, p = .81, ηp2 = 0.02,
90% CI [0.00, 0.11]
F(2, 31) = 2.11, p = .14, ηp2 = 0.12,
90% CI [0.00, 0.27]
F(2, 33) = 1.71, p = .20, ηp2 = 0.09,
90% CI [0.00, 0.23]
F(2, 32) = .02, p = .98, ηp2 < 0.01,
90% CI [0.00, 0.00]
F(1, 22) = .26, p = .61, ηp2 = 0.01,
90% CI [0.00, 0.16]
F(2, 31) = .11, p = .90, ηp2 = 0.01,
90% CI [0.00, 0.04]
F(2, 33) = .04, p = .96, ηp2 < 0.01,
90% CI [0.00, 0.00]
F(2, 32) = .26, p = .78, ηp2 = 0.02,
90% CI [0.00, 0.09]

Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E

Innocent Videos

Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
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Additionally, to ensure that participants did not have a bias towards rendering
either a guilty or innocent culpability judgment, I descriptively assessed the overall
percentage of guilty and innocent judgments made in each evidence disclosure condition.
As demonstrated in Figure 6, there did not appear to be any ceiling effects in terms of
guilty or innocent culpability judgments. Furthermore, SUE-C/E and Late appeared to not
lead to any bias whatsoever.
Figure 6. Percentage of Pre-Confession Guilty and Innocent Culpability Judgments by
Evidence Disclosure Condition

Percentage of guilty and innocent culpability
judgments

100%

Interviewee cheated

90%

Interviewee did not cheat

80%
70%

70%
60%

60%

50% 50%

50%
40%

50% 50%

40%
30%

30%
20%
10%
0%
Early

Late

SUE-C

SUE-C/E

Evidence Disclosure Condition

Note. As each participant made two culpability judgments, the total number of culpability
judgments rendered in each evidence disclosure condition were as follows: Early (n =
48), Late (n = 68), SUE-C (n = 72), and SUE-C/E (n = 70).
Pre-Confession Judgments
Overall Accuracy
To examine participants’ culpability judgment accuracy, I created an overall
accuracy variable. As previously mentioned, all participants made two culpability
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judgments: one for a guilty interviewee and one for an innocent interviewee. If
participants accurately indicated that the guilty interviewee had cheated and that the
innocent interviewee had not cheated, participants received an overall accuracy score of
1. If participants only correctly judged one of the interviewees who they viewed, they
received a score of 0.5. Participants received a score of 0 if they incorrectly judged both
the guilty and innocent interviewees. Across all evidence disclosure conditions, overall
accuracy averaged at 64.3% (SD = 33.2%). Figure 7 displays participants’ overall
accuracy scores by evidence disclosure condition. A one-way ANOVA revealed that
overall accuracy scores did not significantly differ across the evidence disclosure
conditions, F(3, 125) = 1.36, p = .26, ηp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08].
Figure 7. Mean Overall Accuracy Scores by Evidence Disclosure Condition
100%
90%
Mean overall accuracy score

80%
70%

71.4%

67.7%
59.7%

56.3%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Early

Late
SUE-C
Evidence Disclosure Condition

Note. Error bars represent standard errors.
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SUE-C/E

Overall Accuracy Compared to Chance. A one-sample t-test revealed that the
overall accuracy score (64.3%) was significantly higher than chance (i.e., 50%), t(128) =
4.91, p < .001, d = 0.43, 95% CI [0.25, 0.61]. To determine the extent to which accuracy
differed from chance at each level of evidence disclosure, I next conducted four onesample t-tests (critical p = .013). Participants who viewed SUE-C/E interrogations
demonstrated overall accuracy (71.4%) that significantly exceeded that of chance, t(34) =
3.63, p = .001, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.25, 0.97]. A similar pattern emerged for participants
who viewed Late disclosure interrogations (67.7%), t(33) = 2.98, p = .005, d = 0.51, 95%
CI [0.15, 0.87]. Overall accuracy scores in both the Early disclosure (56.3%), t(23) =
0.90, p = .38, d = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.59], and SUE-C (59.7%), t(35) = 2.02, p = .05, d
= 0.34, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.67], conditions did not significantly differ from chance
responding.
Identifying Innocence and Guilt
Table 13 displays the percentage of participants who correctly identified innocent
interviewees as having not cheated (i.e., accurately identifying innocence), as well as the
percentage of participants who correctly identified guilty interviewees as having cheated
(i.e., accurately identifying guilt). A one-tailed, two-proportions z-test23 indicated that the
proportion of participants who correctly identified innocence exceeded the proportion of
participants who were able to correctly identify guilt, z = 1.82, p = .03, 95% CI [-0.01,
0.22].

23

I conducted a one-tailed, rather than two-tailed, z-test because I expected participants to demonstrate a
truth bias, which is a prevalent finding in the deception detection literature (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006).
Additionally, I used a z-test here because I was comparing proportions.
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Table 13. Percentage of Participants Who Accurately Identified Innocence and Who
Accurately Identified Guilt

Innocence Accuracy

Evidence Disclosure Condition
Early
Late
SUE-C
SUE-C/E
n = 24
n = 34
n = 36
n = 35
62.5%
64.7%
77.8%
71.4%

Guilt Accuracy

50.0%

70.6%

41.7%

Total
N = 129
69.8%

71.4%

58.9%

Comparing Culpability Judgment Accuracy Across Evidence Disclosure
Conditions. I carried out two logistic regressions to examine whether the evidence
disclosure method used during interviewees’ interrogations predicted participants’ ability
to accurately identify innocence and guilt (see Table 14 for relevant statistics). The
results showed that there was a significant impact of evidence disclosure on participants’
ability to accurately identify guilt, χ2(3) = 9.46, p = .02, R2Nagelkerke = .10. Notably, the
odds that participants accurately identified guilt were 3.50 times higher if the interrogator
had employed SUE-C/E as opposed to SUE-C. A similar pattern emerged when
comparing the Late and SUE-C conditions: The odds that participants would accurately
identify guilt were 3.36 times higher in the Late condition compared to the SUE-C
condition. Despite influencing participants’ ability to accurately detect guilty
interviewees, evidence disclosure method did not differentially impact participants’
ability to accurately identify innocence, χ2(3) = 2.19, p = .54, R2Nagelkerke = .02.
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Table 14. Results for Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Impact of Evidence
Disclosure on Participants’ Ability to Accurately Identify Innocence and Guilt
Predictor
B (SE)
Wald χ2
p
OR
95% CI
Identifying Innocence
Late vs. Early
.10 (.55)
0.03
.86
1.10
[0.37, 3.26]
SUE-C vs. Early
.74 (.58)
1.63
.20
2.10
[0.67, 6.57]
SUE-C/E vs. Early
.41 (.56)
0.52
.47
1.50
[0.50, 4.53]
Late vs. SUE-C
-.65 (.54)
1.44
.23
0.52
[0.24, 2.09]
SUE-C/E vs. SUE-C -.34 (.55)
0.38
.54
0.71
[0.18, 1.50]
SUE-C/E vs. Late
.31 (.52)
0.36
.55
1.36
[0.49, 3.77]
Identifying Guilt
Late vs. Early
.88 (.56)
2.49
.12
2.40
[0.81, 7.13]
SUE-C vs. Early
-.34 (.53)
0.40
.53
0.71
[0.25, 2.02]
SUE-C/E vs. Early
.92 (.55)
2.74
.10
2.50
[0.84, 7.40]
Late vs. SUE-C
1.21 (.51)
5.74
.02
3.36
[1.25, 9.06]
SUE-C/E vs. SUE-C 1.25 (.50)
6.17
.01
3.50
[1.30, 9.40]
SUE-C/E vs. Late
.04 (.53)
0.01
.94
1.04
[0.37, 2.95]
Note. The second evidence disclosure condition listed in each of the comparisons served
as the reference group for the regression analyses. The model was run three times, with a
different reference category each time, in order to make all comparisons across the
evidence disclosure conditions.
Post-Confession Judgments
Overall Accuracy
I calculated overall accuracy scores in the same manner as I did for preconfession overall accuracy scores. Across all evidence disclosure conditions,
participants’ mean accuracy was 59.3% (SD = 29.2%). Similar to the pattern seen for preconfession scores, post-confession overall accuracy scores did not significantly differ
across the evidence disclosure conditions, as revealed by a one-way ANOVA, F(3, 125)
= 1.35, p = .26, ηp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08] (see Figure 8 for post-confession scores,
compared against pre-confession scores).
Overall Accuracy Compared to Chance. As revealed by a one-sample t-test,
participants’ mean accuracy score (59.3%) exceeded chance responding (i.e., 50%),
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t(128) = 3.62, p < .001, d = 0.32, 95% CI [0.14, 0.50]. Additionally, four one-sample ttests (Bonferroni-correction: critical p = .013) showed that post-confession scores
exceeded chance responding in the SUE-C/E condition, t(34) = 3.26, p = .003, d = 0.55,
95% CI [0.19, 0.90], but did not significantly exceed chance in the other three evidence
disclosure conditions: Early, t(24) = 1.81, p = .08, d = 0.37, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.78]; Late,
t(33) = 2.03, p = .05, d = 0.35, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.69]; nor SUE-C, t(35) = .30, p = .77, d
= 0.05, 95% CI [-0.28, 0.38].

Mean overall accuracy score

Figure 8. Mean Overall Accuracy Scores by Evidence Disclosure Condition (PostConfession Scores Presented Against Pre-Confession Scores)
100%

Pre-Confession

90%

Post-Confession

80%
70%

62.5%
56.3%

71.4%

67.7%
60.3%

59.7%

60%

64.3%

51.4%

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Early

Late
SUE-C
Evidence Disclosure Condition

SUE-C/E

Note. Error bars represent standard errors.
Comparing Pre- and Post- Confession Overall Accuracy. A paired-samples ttest revealed a significant drop in participants’ overall accuracy scores from 64.3% to
59.3% after reading that interviewees had confessed, t(128) = 1.96, p = .05, Hedge’s g =
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0.16, 95% CI [-0.002, 0.32]. However, a series of four paired-samples t-tests24 (critical p
= .013) comparing pre- and post-confession scores at each level of evidence disclosure
indicated that pre- and post-confession accuracy scores did not significantly differ for any
of the evidence disclosure groups: Early, t(23) = 1.00, p = .33, Hedge’s g = 0.18, 95% CI
[-0.18, 0.55]; Late, t(33) = 1.71, p = .10, Hedge’s g = 0.22, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.49]; SUE-C,
t(35) = 1.78, p = .08, Hedge’s g = 0.29, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.62]; nor SUE-C/E, t(34) = 1.30,
p = .20, Hedge’s g = 0.28, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.58].
Identifying Innocence and Guilt
Figures 9 and 10 display the percentage of participants who, after reading about a
confession: (a) correctly identified innocent interviewees as having not cheated (i.e.,
accurately identifying innocence), and (b) who correctly identified guilty interviewees as
having cheated (i.e., accurately identifying guilt). These percentages are displayed against
the related pre-confession percentages, as well as by evidence disclosure condition. The
proportion of participants who correctly identified guilt post-confession (80.6%)
surpassed the proportion of participants who correctly identified innocence (38.0%), as
indicated by a one-tailed, two-proportion z-test, z = 6.97, p < .001, 95% CI [0.31, 0.53].
Change in Accurate Innocence Identifications. I ran five McNemar chi-square
analyses25 (Bonferroni-correction: critical p = .010; see Table 15 for McNemar findings),
one for each evidence disclosure condition and one for the total, to determine whether the
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I decided to run a series of t-tests with a Bonferroni correction rather than a repeated measures ANOVA
because there was no significant interaction between interviewee veracity and evidence disclosure, meaning
that practical insight into the effect of the different evidence disclosure techniques on observers’ overall
accuracy would not be fully explored.
25

The McNemar chi-square accounts for the fact that I was analyzing a repeated measure.
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number of participants who correctly identified innocence changed from prior to reading
about the confession to after reading about the confession (see Figure 9). Overall, the
proportion of participants who correctly judged innocent interviewees as innocent preconfession (69.8%) was greater than the portion of accurate participants post-confession
(38.0%). The pattern of a decrease from pre- to post-confession in the number of
participants who accurately identified innocence held across all evidence disclosure
conditions, except for the Early disclosure condition in which the decrease was nonsignificant (p = .05) after applying the Bonferroni-corrected critical p-value.
Table 15. Results from the McNemar Chi-Square Analyses Comparing the Proportion of
Participants Pre- and Post-Confession Who Accurately Identified Innocence
Evidence Disclosure Condition

χ2McNemar

p

95% CI

Early disclosure
4.00
.05
[-0.2%, 31.6%]
Late disclosure
10.00
.002
[12.3%, 43.5%]
SUE-C
13.00
< .001
[18.4%, 50.4%]
SUE-C/E
14.00
< .001
[21.3%, 54.2%]
Total
41.00
< .001
[23.3%, 39.4%]
Note. The confidence interval for all McNemar chi-square tests represents the 95% CI for
the difference in paired proportions. Also note that I used the uncorrected McNemar test,
as the corrected test is overly conservative.
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Figure 9. Percentage of Participants Who Accurately Identified Innocence (Pre- and PostConfession Across Evidence Disclosure Conditions)

Percentage of participants accurately identifying an
innocent interviewee as innocent

Accurately Identifying Innocence
Pre-Confession
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80%
70%
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Note. For all evidence disclosure conditions other than Early, the percentage of
participants who were accurate was significantly lower at post-confession compared to
pre-confession.
Change in Accurate Guilt Identifications. To examine if the number of
participants correctly identifying guilt changed from pre- to post-confession (see Figure
10), I again ran five McNemar chi-square analyses (Bonferroni-correction: critical p =
.010), one for each evidence disclosure condition and one for the total (see Table 16 for
McNemar findings). Across all evidence disclosure conditions, I found that the
percentage of participants who correctly identified a guilty interviewee as being guilty
increased from pre-confession (58.9%) to post-confession (80.6%). Similarly, the number
of accurate participants was higher post- than pre-confession in the Early, SUE-C, and
SUE-C/E evidence disclosure conditions. The percentage of accurate participants did not
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significantly increase in the Late condition after applying the Bonferroni-corrected
critical p-value.
Table 16. Results from the McNemar Chi-Square Analyses Comparing the Proportion of
Participants Pre- and Post-Confession Who Accurately Identified Guilt
χ2McNemar

Evidence Disclosure Condition

p

95% CI

Early disclosure
7.00
.008
[-46.6%, -8.4%]
Late disclosure
5.00
.03
[-28.7%, -1.2%]
SUE-C
7.00
.008
[-42.2%, -9.5%]
SUE-C/E
9.00
.003
[-42.2%, -9.5%]
Total
28.00
< .001
[-28.9%, -14.4%]
Note. The confidence interval for all McNemar chi-square tests represents the 95% CI for
the difference in paired proportions. Also note that I used the uncorrected McNemar test,
as the corrected test is overly conservative.
Figure 10. Percentage of Participants Who Accurately Identified Guilt (Pre- and PostConfession Across Evidence Disclosure Conditions)

Percentage of participants accurately identifying a
guilty interviewee as guilty

Accurately Identifying Guilt

Pre-Confession
Post-Confession

110%
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50%

80.6%
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50.0%
41.7%
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Note. The percentage of participants who correctly identified guilt was higher postconfession compared to pre-confession for the Early, SUE-C, and SUE-C/E conditions.
The pre- and post-confession percentages did not significantly differ in the Late
condition.

107

Culpability Judgment Accuracy Across Evidence Disclosure Conditions. To
determine whether the presence of a confession impacted the influence of evidence
disclosure method on participants’ ability to accurately judge interviewees’ culpability, I
carried out two logistic regressions (one for identifying innocence and one for identifying
guilt) examining post-confession judgments (see Table 17 for regression statistics). The
model for identifying guilt was significant, χ2(3) = 16.70, p = .001, R2Nagelkerke = .19. After
reading that the interviewee had confessed, the odds that participants who viewed an
interrogation characterized by Late disclosure would accurately identify guilt were 3.69
times greater than for participants who viewed a SUE-C interrogation. Similarly, the odds
that participants viewing a SUE-C/E interrogation would make an accurate guilt
judgment were 21.64 times greater than the odds for participants viewing a SUE-C
interrogation and 8.95 times greater than the odds for participants viewing an Early
interrogation. Yet, the type of evidence disclosure method employed in the interrogations
did not predict participants’ ability to accurately identify innocence, χ2(3) = 1.58, p = .66,
R2Nagelkerke = .02.
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Table 17. Results for Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Impact of Evidence
Disclosure on Participants’ Ability to Accurately Identify Innocence and Guilt After
Learning that the Interviewee Had Confessed
Predictor
B (SE)
Wald χ2
p
OR
95% CI
Identifying Innocence
Late vs. Early
-.43 (.55)
0.65
.42
0.65
[0.22, 1.88]
SUE-C vs. Early
-.17 (.53)
0.10
.75
0.84
[0.30, 2.39]
SUE-C/E vs. Early
-.61 (.55)
1.25
.26
0.54
[0.19, 1.59]
Late vs. SUE-C
-.27 (.49)
0.30
.58
0.76
[0.29, 2.01]
SUE-C/E vs. SUE-C
-.44 (.50)
0.80
.37
0.64
[0.24, 1.70]
SUE-C/E vs. Late
-.17 (.51)
0.12
.73
0.84
[0.31, 2.29]
Identifying Guilt
Late vs. Early
.42 (.70)
0.37
.55
1.53
[0.39, 5.99]
SUE-C vs. Early
-.88 (.61)
2.11
.15
0.41
[0.13, 1.36]
SUE-C/E vs. Early
2.19 (1.13)
3.75
.05
8.95
[0.97, 82.32]
Late vs. SUE-C
1.31 (.59)
4.85
.03
3.69
[1.16, 11.80]
SUE-C/E vs. SUE-C 3.07 (1.07)
8.25
.004
21.64 [2.65, 176.41]
SUE-C/E vs. Late
1.77 (1.14)
2.48
.12
5.86
[0.65, 53.09]
Note. The second evidence disclosure condition listed in each of the comparisons served
as the reference group for the regression analyses. The model was run three times, with a
different reference category each time, in order to make all comparisons across the
evidence disclosure conditions.
Participants’ Subjective Perception of the Confession’s Impact on Their Decisions
Participants indicated how influential they believed interviewees’ confessions
were on their ultimate decisions about interviewees’ culpability (see Figure 11 for
means). To assess this outcome variable, I carried out four paired-samples t-tests26
(Bonferroni-correction: critical p = .013) comparing participants’ responses about guilty
interviewees to their responses about innocent interviewees. The results indicated that
participants in the SUE-C/E condition found guilty interviewees’ confessions to be more
influential on their ultimate guilt decision than they found innocent interviewees’
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Again, I ran a series of t-tests with a Bonferroni correction rather than a repeated measures ANOVA
because there was no significant interaction between interviewee culpability and evidence disclosure, and
the analysis presented here offers more concrete insight into which evidence disclosure technique results in
less weight being placed on false confessions.
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confessions to be, t(34) = 2.76, p = .009, Hedge’s g = 0.48, 95% CI [0.12, 0.85]. A
similar pattern emerged for the Late condition, t(33) = 2.46, p = .019, Hedge’s g = 0.36,
95% CI [0.06, 0.67], albeit the significance level did not exceed the Bonferroni cut-off
value. Confession influence scores did not vary by interviewee culpability for the Early
disclosure, t(23) = 1.51, p = .15, Hedge’s g = 0.38, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.92], and SUE-C,
t(35) = .95, p = .35, Hedge’s g = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.51], conditions.
Figure 11. Participants’ Mean Scores for How Influential They Perceived Interviewees’
Confessions to Be on Their Ultimate Decision About Interviewees’ Culpability
g = 0.48

Perception of confession influence
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Note. Error bars represent standard errors. Effect sizes represent Hedge’s g.
Discussion
Culpability Judgment Accuracy
Across all evidence disclosure conditions, the participants in the present study
demonstrated an overall accuracy rate (64.3%) that significantly exceeded chance. This
accuracy rate is relatively high when considering the accuracy rate that is typically seen
in the tangential deception detection literature (e.g., in their meta-analysis, Bond &
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DePaulo, 2006, found an average of 54% accuracy rate). However, the present accuracy
rate seems to be driven by the contribution of the SUE-C/E (71.4% overall accuracy) and
late disclosure (67.7% overall accuracy) questioning methods to increasing culpability
judgment accuracy. The benefit of SUE-C/E and late disclosure seemingly stem from
observers being especially successful at identifying guilty interviewees who are being
questioned by these two techniques. Notably, participants in the SUE-C/E and late
disclosure conditions significantly outperformed participants in the SUE-C condition in
regard to accurately identifying guilt specifically. This latter finding is best characterized
by a postulation made by Hartwig et al. (2005, p. 480): The SUE technique is “mainly a
technique for detecting lies rather than truths.” Indeed, the present findings fall in line
with past SUE research that indicates that deception detection accuracy is improved,
primarily via enhanced detection of liars, when the late disclosure method is used (e.g.,
Hartwig et al., 2005).
The present findings also contribute new insight to the SUE literature, as there are
no known studies that examine the effects of SUE-C and SUE-C/E on culpability
judgment accuracy. Interestingly, using SUE-C resulted in the lowest number of
participants who were able to accurately identify guilt, whereas using SUE-C/E resulted
in the highest number of participants who accurately identified guilt. One potential reason
for this finding may rest with the line of questioning that is associated with each of these
techniques. Both SUE-C/E and SUE-C involve the interrogator pointing out
interviewees’ evidence-inconsistent statements; however, it is only in SUE-C/E that
interviewees are able to explain why they were inconsistent with the evidence. It is
therefore possible that guilty interviewees’ explanations for inconsistencies were
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perceived as weak by observers, consequently highlighting the interviewees’ guilt.
Indeed, guilty interviewees may have not been prepared to respond to a request for an
explanation, which represents a sort of unanticipated question. When formulating
responses prior to an interview, liars do not typically consider the need to prepare for
unanticipated questions and thus when put on the spot during an interview, they fail to
provide adequate responses (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). As such, guilty interviewees
questioned with SUE-C/E may have highlighted their guilt via their responses to
explanations for inconsistencies, thus contributing to the high guilt-accuracy achieved by
observers in the SUE-C/E condition. Relatedly, it is possible that SUE-C/E’s explanation
component forced guilty interviewees to more often change their stories (i.e., make
within-statement inconsistencies)—a cue to deception that observers in the present study
may have relied on. However, given that I did not code for within-statement
inconsistencies in Study 1, this is a postulation that future analyses can examine.
The Impact of Confessions
The presence of a confession resulted in a decrease in overall culpability
judgment accuracy across all evidence disclosure conditions (decrease from 64.3% to
59.3%), as well as a general decrease in the number of participants who accurately
identified innocence. This drop in accurate innocence identifications, which was even
seen in the overall well-performing SUE-C/E, falls in line with a common phenomenon
in the confession literature; namely, confessions are powerful pieces of evidence that
typically sway evaluators to make guilty judgments (e.g., Kassin & Neumann, 1997).
Regarding the drop in accurate innocence identifications in the SUE-C/E condition
specifically, one potential explanation may be due to SUE-C/E’s explanation component.
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Specifically, any pre-confession statement inconsistencies may have served to highlight
innocent interviewee’s innocence (e.g., they had viable explanations for inconsistencies);
however, a confession may have undermined this positive effect by leading participants
to rely on inconsistencies as indicators of lying.
Confessions did, however, improve participants’ accuracy in identifying guilty
interviewees, and especially so for the SUE-C/E and late evidence disclosure conditions.
Furthermore, the post-confession accuracy rate achieved in the SUE-C/E condition
remained significantly above chance—a finding that did not emerge in any of the other
three evidence disclosure conditions. This effect appeared to be driven by nearly all
participants (a little over 97%) in the SUE-C/E condition accurately identifying guilty
interviewees after being told about a confession.
One potential explanation for this latter finding rests with the notion that SUEC/E is particularly effective in highlighting guilty interviewees’ guilt. Indeed, guilt
identification accuracy in the SUE-C/E condition was already high (over 70%) prior to
participants being told that interviewees had confessed. Due to the aforementioned
potential reasons for this result (i.e., inadequate explanations, within-statement
inconsistencies), there may have also been a considerable number of participants who
were near the threshold of rendering a guilty judgment for guilty interviewees. Given that
they were near the threshold of judging the interviewees as guilty, learning that the
interviewees had confessed may have then had a greater effect on leading these
participants to shift their inaccurate pre-confession judgment of innocence to an accurate
post-confession judgment of guilt. Indeed, a descriptive assessment of participants’
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reported extent to which a guilty interviewee’s confession had influenced their culpability
judgment was highest in the SUE-C/E condition.
IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the current research was to address critical gaps that exist within the
SUE literature. In doing so, the results from the present studies offer a better
understanding of the SUE technique, as well as provide insight as to which variations of
SUE are most effective in aiding law enforcement officers in achieving their investigative
goals.
Studying the SUE Technique with a Psychologically Realistic Paradigm
All past SUE studies have employed mock crime paradigms. Mock crime studies
are extremely important to the advancement of the interrogation field. However, it is
important that findings from these studies are replicated using psychologically realistic
paradigms given a number of limitations that are tied to mock crime paradigms. Although
findings stemming from these mock crime paradigm studies do offer valuable insight on
the types of statements guilty and innocent suspects make during an investigative
interview, the findings are not highly generalizable to actual criminal contexts in which
suspects have (or have not) committed crimes on their own volition. Furthermore,
participants in mock crime studies, although motivated to lie, are not in a high stakes
situation and do not typically face potential punishment. For instance, in the original SUE
study, Hartwig et al. (2005) told participants that they would receive two lottery tickets
for being convincing truth-tellers. This incentive is in stark contrast to the stakes the
current participants faced: a fine of $50–500 for committing (or not) a transgression of
their own volition. Additionally, guilty participants in mock crime studies are sometimes
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explicitly told to lie about the fact that they had committed the crime (e.g., Hartwig et al.,
2005), offered financial incentives for confessing and no financial reward for making
unbelievable denials (e.g., Sellers & Kebbell, 2009), or explicitly told to convince the
interrogator that they are innocent (e.g., Luke et al., 2013). In the present study,
participants were not given any instruction regarding what goal they should pursue during
the interrogation. As Luke et al. (2013) posit, lack of a concrete instruction for guilty
participants to lie during the interview enables researchers to gain a better understanding
of the types of decisions suspects will make without any external guidance.
Despite these aforementioned differences between mock crime and
psychologically realistic paradigms, Study 1’s results generally fell in line with findings
from past SUE studies (Hartwig et al., 2014). Namely, SUE techniques resulted in guilty
suspects being more inconsistent with the evidence as compared to innocent suspects,
with the addition of SUE-C and SUE-C/E inducing guilty suspects to being forthcoming.
The fact that the present findings correspond to those stemming from past mock crime
studies lends further support for the efficacy of the SUE technique in the context of
suspect interrogations.
Confessions and the SUE Technique
There is very little work that has directly examined the effect of evidence
disclosure on suspect confession decisions, and the two known empirical studies that do
address this topic have key limitations. Specifically, these two studies employed mock
crime paradigms (the limitations of which have already been discussed) and either
resulted in extremely low confession rates (Jordan et al., 2012) or only examined guilty
participants’ confession decisions (Sellers & Kebbell, 2009). Thus, Study 1 explicitly
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measured true and false confession decisions as one of its primary outcome variables and
did so using a psychologically realistic paradigm that presumably resulted in participant
decisions that would be more reflective of decisions made in real world interrogation
settings.
Study 1’s confession findings did not conform to my hypothesis that confessions
would be most diagnostic in the SUE-C/E condition, followed by the late disclosure and
the SUE-C conditions, with all three SUE techniques outperforming the early disclosure
condition. Instead, the results demonstrated that confession rates remained relatively
stable across evidence disclosure conditions, and no one of the evidence disclosure
conditions rendered a high number of false confessions (i.e., there was only one or two
false confessors in each of the evidence disclosure conditions). The implications of these
findings are twofold. First, the usage of early evidence disclosure did not result in a high
number of false confessors. Although early evidence disclosure may be detrimental to
investigators’ ability to distinguish between liars and truth-tellers, as past (e.g., Hartwig
et al., 2006) and the present research demonstrate, it is seemingly not detrimental in
regard to increasing the risk of false confession. Second, SUE techniques do not seem to
further reduce the risk of false confession as compared to the early evidence disclosure
method. However, this finding could be due to the overall floor effects that emerged for
false confessions in Study 1, or to the fact that participants rated the evidence against
them as weak.
Taken together, the present findings suggest that evidence disclosure techniques
used in isolation of other interrogation tactics do not strongly impact suspects’ decisions
to confess. However, a single interrogation tactic is rarely employed over the course of an
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interrogation; instead, multiple tactics are employed throughout suspect interrogations at
various timepoints (e.g., Kelly et al., 2016; Leo, 1996). It is therefore important to
consider what the effects of different evidence disclosure methods are on suspect
confession decisions when these disclosure tactics are paired with other interrogation
tactics—an avenue that future research should pursue.
Testing SUE-C and SUE-C/E with Innocent Suspects and Against Late Disclosure
Past studies examining the efficacy of SUE-C (May et al., 2017; Tekin et al.,
2015; 2016) and SUE-C/E (Tekin et al., 2016) did not include an innocent suspect
sample. Although the counter-interrogation strategy literature suggests that innocent
suspects are typically forthcoming (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008) and should therefore be
more consistent with the evidence, it is still highly important to include an innocent
suspect sample when determining the efficacy of any interrogation tactic (e.g.,
information diagnosticity can be measured). The SUE literature consistently shows that
late evidence disclosure results in innocent suspects making fewer statement-evidence
inconsistencies than guilty suspects; thus, it would be expected that SUE-C and SUE-C/E
would also demonstrate a similar pattern since suspects are also not presented with all of
the evidence at once. However, what remained unknown in the literature was whether
SUE-C and SUE-C/E would enhance this difference to a greater extent than late evidence
disclosure had been shown to do.
Indeed, Study 1’s statement-evidence inconsistency results did highlight the
importance of including an innocent suspect sample as well as a comparison to the late
disclosure condition. The effect size of the difference in statement-evidence
inconsistencies between guilty and innocent suspects was overall greatest in the SUE-C
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and SUE-C/E conditions, thus suggesting that these two variations of SUE may be
preferable over late disclosure in terms of enhancing the difference in deceptive verbal
cues between liars and truth-tellers.
Examining Culpability Judgments in Light of SUE-C and SUE-C/E
Overall, SUE-C/E outperformed the other evidence disclosure methods in terms
of aiding observers to better distinguish between guilty and innocent interviewees in
Study 2. The goal of the SUE-C/E is to move guilty suspects from engaging in avoidant
strategies to becoming more forthcoming during questioning (Tekin et al., 2016). Guilty
interviewees questioned with SUE-C/E in Study 1 were indeed more forthcoming, as
demonstrated by the overall low number of statement-evidence inconsistencies seen in
this condition. The enhanced forthcomingness in the SUE-C/E condition presumably
resulted in observers in Study 2 being more easily able to pinpoint guilty interviewees.
Interestingly, SUE-C, which is also meant to induce guilty suspects into being more
forthcoming (Tekin et al., 2015), did not effectively aid observers in rendering accurate
culpability judgments (the lowest accuracy rates were demonstrated in the SUE-C
condition in Study 2). As mentioned in Study 2’s Discussion, this could have been due to
the differences in the line of questioning used in SUE-C versus SUE-C/E: Interviewees in
SUE-C did not get the chance to explain any evidence-inconsistent statements as did
interviewees in SUE-C/E. Guilty interviewees in the SUE-C/E condition may have not
anticipated this additional request for explanations and thus may have provided a weak
response and/or a response that was inconsistent with their prior responses, thereby
making their guilt more apparent.
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Additionally, one potential reason for why participants who viewed late
disclosure interrogations outperformed those who viewed SUE-C interrogations rests
with the fact that guilty interviewees in late disclosure interrogations received no
corrective feedback as they made statement-evidence inconsistencies. Due to the lack of
feedback, late disclosure guilty interviewees were presumably not as likely to shift to a
forthcoming strategy but instead remained avoidant, which essentially emphasized their
guilt to observers. Contrarily, guilty interviewees questioned with SUE-C presumably
shifted to a more forthcoming strategy but considering the lack of the benefits rendered
by explanations as in SUE-C/E, observers in the SUE-C group were less able to identify
guilty interviewees as compared to observers in the SUE-C/E group. Thus, SUE-C failed
to adequately assist observers in detecting guilty interviewees as compared to late
disclosure and SUE-C/E.
Limitations
Study 1
Although the interrogation paradigm that I employed was highly believable, it did
result in many participants randomly assigned to the guilty condition not actually
engaging in the cheating transgression. There are two potential reasons for this. First, the
act of cheating from a cellphone may have been perceived as an overly extreme form of
cheating. Many past studies employed lesser forms of cheating (e.g., Russano et al., 2005,
had participants cheat by verbally sharing one answer with a confederate who requested
help), and perhaps the use of a cellphone with a cheat sheet on it seemed to be a more
severe form of breaking the experimental rules (note: Evans et al., 2013, also made use of
a cheat sheet on a cellphone, but participants themselves did not have access to the cheat
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sheet or cellphone and only observed the confederate using them). Second, the present
study served as the first time a psychologically realistic interrogation paradigm was used
with a sample other than college students. It is possible that community member
participants take experimental rules more seriously than do college student participants,
thus resulting in lower rates of cheating among community member participants.
Furthermore, the differences in demographic variables between college student and
community member samples could lend themselves as predictors of willingness to
engage in cheating behaviors. Considering these possibilities, a future study should
directly compare college student and community member samples regarding their
cheating and confession behaviors. Findings from such a study would have strong
implications for how future interrogation research is conducted.
Another limitation to Study 1 is a limitation that is inherent to all laboratory-based
interrogation research: Participants in the study were not suspects of real crimes. In order
to examine how guilty and innocent suspects behave during interrogations, researchers
must make a trade-off, sacrificing external validity (participants are not real crime
suspects) to maximize internal validity (researchers know the ground truth in terms of
suspect culpability). Despite this limitation, the present study used a psychologically
realistic paradigm (guilty participants cheated on their own accord and both guilty and
innocent participants believed that they were in trouble and that there were financial
consequences to be faced).
Additionally, the interrogators in the present study were research assistants.
Although the interrogators received SUE training that is comparable to what actual law
enforcement may receive, the interrogators had no experience in questioning real
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suspects, nor did they have experience in conducting investigative interviews, or
investigations, beyond the context of this study. This limitation does raise the need for
future research to involve law enforcement officers in examining the effects of various
interrogation techniques. Such studies would, for example, employ procedures such as
those used by Hartwig et al. (2006) and Luke et al. (2016): Law enforcement officers
would constitute the participant sample, as they would be trained in different evidence
disclosure techniques, conduct interrogations on mock suspects, and make interrogation
outcome decisions. Researchers may take this line of work one step further by subjecting
participants to a psychologically realistic paradigm (as used in Study 1) and then having
law enforcement who were trained (or untrained) in SUE methods conduct the
questioning. Although such a study may push ethical boundaries, there are potential
solutions to render the study ethically-sound. For instance, law enforcement officers
could pretend to be part of the research team so that participants would not believe that
they are in trouble with real police.
Study 2
One limitation that emerged in Study 2 was that of participant attention. Given
that the study was fully online, I was not able to control participants’ engagement in
viewing the interrogation videos. I attempted to address this by including a sound check
test that participants had to pass in order to continue with a study, thus ensuring that they
could, at the bare minimum, hear the interrogation audio. Additionally, I included
attention check questions. As evident by the exclusions I made on the basis of these
attention check questions, many participants did not seem to pay attention to the content
of what was being said during the interrogation videos. Although failure to correctly
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respond to attention check questions could have been due to memory errors or inability to
retain details discussed during the interrogation, there was no way to rule out that failures
were due to participants not paying attention, as the study was completed fully online.
Furthermore, the attention check questions were based on highly relevant information
discussed during the interrogation (e.g., whether the interviewee discussed writing
something while looking at the forbidden phone). It is therefore hard to believe that
participants, who had been instructed to determine whether interviewees had or had not
cheated on the test, could not correctly answer at least 75% of the attention check
questions correctly if they had been paying attention. To resolve this issue, future studies
should consider having participants come into the lab to watch interrogation videos and
make culpability judgments. This procedure can help researchers better ensure that
participants are able to properly hear the audio and are completing the study in an
environment without any distractions. Future researchers could also consider
incentivizing participants to make accurate culpability judgements, which may encourage
participants to pay closer attention to the study stimuli.
Another limitation to Study 2 was the quality of the video stimuli. Although the
audio was clear, the visual quality of the video stimuli was not perfectly clear.
Specifically, participants could see interviewees’ gross movements, but not minute
movements (e.g., eye gaze). This limitation, however, could have resulted in participants
relying more on verbal cues to deception rather than nonverbal cues, and thus be a
potential underlying cause for the relatively high culpability judgment accuracy rate
achieved by participants in Study 2. Indeed, reliance on nonverbal cues to deception (e.g.,
eye gaze) does not result in successful deception detection (e.g., Hartwig & Bond, 2011),
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with research instead showing that interviewing techniques focusing on eliciting verbal
cues to deception facilitate deception detection accuracy (a tangential measure to the
present culpability judgment measure; Vrij & Granhag, 2012).
Practical Implications and Future Directions
The combination of results stemming from Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that SUEC/E may be the most effective method of evidence disclosure (of those tested in the
present research) to employ during suspect interrogations. Regarding confessions, SUEC/E (like the other SUE methods) does not reduce true confession rates, nor does it
inflate false confession rates. Furthermore, SUE-C/E seemingly triggers guilty suspects to
be more forthcoming when being questioned (a replication of past findings; Tekin et al.,
2016), as well as results in differential rates of statement-evidence inconsistencies
between guilty and innocent suspects—a cue that law enforcement officers report
considering when detecting deception (Deeb et al., 2018). Lastly, SUE-C/E is most
effective in enhancing observers’ culpability judgment accuracy. For these reasons, I
recommend that the underlying theory and practical concepts of SUE-C/E be explored
during trainings in which researchers promote evidence-based interrogation methods to
law enforcement.27
Regarding evidence-based trainings, we see in prior studies that SUE trainings are
effective: Law enforcement officers who are trained in SUE can effectively apply SUE
techniques to increase the accuracy of their interrogation outcome decisions (Hartwig et

27

It is important to highlight during trainings some caveats of the SUE technique. First, the SUE technique
works only when evidence exists. Second, since the SUE technique relies on verbal cues to deception, it is
effective for cases in which the interviewee is cooperatively speaking with the interrogator. Third, proper
implementation of SUE requires preparation time in order to effectively structure evidence-related
questions.
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al., 2006; Luke et al., 2016). However, Hartwig et al. (2006) and Luke et al. (2016) did
not explore SUE-C/E concepts during training, but rather the mechanisms underlying
SUE with a focus on late disclosure. As such, future research should aim to examine the
effects of training SUE-C/E specifically to law enforcement officers. On this note, it is
important to recognize that SUE-C/E is a more complex method compared to late
disclosure, therefore presumably requiring more time and resources to train. In instances
in which trainings might be limited in time and resources, the training of late disclosure is
still valuable. Indeed, the present research shows that late disclosure still renders
differences between guilty and innocent interviewees in terms of deceptive cues (albeit to
a smaller extent than does SUE-C/E), and enhances observers’ culpability judgment
accuracy.
It is also important to note that further development and refinement of the SUE
technique should be continually pursued. For instance, there is a need to explore the
effectiveness of different approaches interrogators can take when confronting statementevidence inconsistencies (Granhag & Luke, 2018). Most recently, Luke & Granhag
(2020) have begun to tackle this need by testing two variations (selective and reactive
techniques) of the Shift-of-Strategy (SoS) approach, which is an extension of SUE-C and
SUE-C/E variations. The researchers found that participants questioned with the reactive
technique (responding to any inconsistency) provided more new information than did
participants who were directly questioned with no specific evidence disclosure technique
employed; yet, the selective technique (responding to only severe inconsistencies) was
ineffective in shifting participants to becoming more forthcoming. Although these
findings are insightful, they do highlight the need to conduct further research on how
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interrogators should confront statement-evidence inconsistencies, as the framing of
confrontations does seemingly have effects on interrogation outcomes. Furthermore,
continued research in this domain can help inform the development of law enforcement
SUE trainings, as it is important for researchers to be able to provide officers with
concrete recommendations on how to implement confrontations in the most effective
manner (Granhag & Luke, 2018).
Additionally, it is crucial that more research be conducted regarding the
implications that different SUE techniques have for observers’ interrogation judgments.
One avenue for such future studies concerns the camera focus used for interrogation
recordings. For instance, participants in Study 2 only viewed equal-focus interrogations
(i.e., both the interrogator and the suspect were in the frame). Past research has shown
that when viewing suspect-focused interrogations, observers view the suspect as guiltier
than they do when viewing the same interrogation from an equal-focus (see Lassiter,
Ware, Lindberg, & Ratcliff, 2010, for a review). It would be interesting to examine
whether suspects questioned with SUE techniques are also susceptible to this bias—a
research question that future studies should address.
Lastly, future research should examine how the implementation of SUE impacts
prosecutors’ decisions (e.g., whether to charge a suspect, whether to offer a plea deal,
what sentencing to seek). The SUE technique is presumably conducive to helping
prosecutors build effective cases, as SUE functions to elicit actionable information from
suspects, which can have implications for the specific case outcomes prosecutors seek.
Additionally, because SUE has been demonstrated to enhance the difference between
guilty and innocent suspects (both in the present study and in past research), investigators
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implementing SUE may ultimately aid the prosecution in making more accurate decisions
about whether to charge suspects. Future studies should examine these questions, thereby
informing the field on whether the benefits of SUE extend beyond the interrogation room.
V. CONCLUSION
The SUE technique is a promising evidence-based interrogation method that can
help interrogators achieve their goals of eliciting information from suspects and better
distinguish liars from truth-tellers. Findings from the present study further supported the
SUE technique’s efficacy, as well as offered novel insight on the benefits of employing
SUE-C/E. Although researchers can confidently recommend the use of the SUE
technique to law enforcement, there is still much work that needs to be accomplished in
terms of refining the details surrounding SUE’s implementation. By working together on
SUE development and training studies, researchers and law enforcement can achieve this
goal and ultimately make strides in improving interrogation methods.
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